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Channeling Police Discretion:
The Hidden Potential of Focused Deterrence
David Thachert

ABSTRACT
The breadth of the criminal law and the unfettered discretion it creates are among
the most significant challenges facing American criminaljustice today. These twin
problems have a particularly corrosive effect on policing, where they lay the
foundations for many of the most prominent flashpoints for community anger,
including intensive police surveillance, arbitrary enforcement, racial
discrimination, and the cavalier use of pretextual authority. This paper considers
the potential of the so-called "focused deterrence" strategy to counteract these
dangers by channeling police discretion along more principled routes than it
usually follows. Although the focused deterrence model is most commonly
understood as a powerful strategy for combating crime, I argue that it should also
be understoodas a powerful strategy for advancing the rule of law. At its core, the
focused deterrence model aims to make the exercise of discretion more deliberate
and transparent, redirecting slack criminal justice authority towards the most
significant community problems rather than squandering it on the haphazard
enforcement of whichever violations of the law happen to come to official attention.
By establishing deliberative forums for accomplishing that goal, well-executed
focused deterrence initiatives help to combat the arbitraryand excessive use of
overbroad legal authority. More substantively, the model's commitment to
deterrence provides an important source of focus and constraint. Properly
understood, deterrence is not just a mechanism of crime prevention but a moral
ideal rooted in the right to self-defense. If we take that ideal seriously, as many
focused deterrence initiatives have, it rules out the opportunistic use of legal
authority to prevent crime at all costs, including the cost of disregardingthe rights
and dignity of suspected offenders. In all of these respects, focused deterrence
initiatives have the potential to help reassert the rule of law in an environment
where it has become precarious. I demonstrate that this potential is not an
accidental byproduct of an initiative designed for other purposes but a consequence
of its intellectualgenealogy-a legacy of its forgotten roots in an earlierera's efforts
to understandand tame police discretion.
Too much law amounts to no law at all.
William J. Stuntzl

t Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy and A. Alfred Taubman College of Architecture and
Urban Planning at the University of Michigan. Thanks to Herman Goldstein, David Kennedy,
Michael Scott, and David Weisburd for helpful comments and encouragement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The reach of American criminal law is staggering. It is now
possible to end up in jail for what seems like an unlimited range of
conduct: for spitting in public, walking on the wrong side of the street,
failing to return library books, and riding a bicycle without a bell,
among many other things. There is a risk of jail, moreover, not only for
doing the things that lawmakers want to put a stop to, but also for
enabling them: not only burglarizing homes but also possessing
burglars' tools, not only using drugs but also hosting a party where
drugs may be used, not only speeding but also using a radar detector,
not only engaging in gang-related violence but also appearing in public
with fellow gang members. In each case the risk of jail is overdetermined, for what the criminal law covers, it covers repetitively: it
bans carjacking as well as the robbery and kidnapping that comprise it;
it bans mail fraud as well as the particular kinds of scams that might
be conducted through the mail; and it bans robbery as well as its more
easily proven analogues, such as theft while possessing a weapon and
theft that risks harm to others. 2
Most famously, the criminal law of recent years has authorized
remarkably harsh punishments for all this misbehavior: five years in
prison for two sugar packets worth of crack cocaine, a life sentence for
theft if the thief has already been to prison twice, and fifteen years for
possession of a single bullet by a career criminal. After conviction,
probationers and parolees are subject to pervasive restrictions on their
behavior: who they associate with, where they live, when they leave
3
their homes, and whether and where they work.
Whatever we might say about each of these provisions in isolation,
in the aggregate they shape the character of American criminal justice

WILLIAM J.

STUNTz, COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3 (2011).

I take the examples of the breadth of the criminal law from DOUGLAS

HUSAK,

OVERCRIMINALIZATION (2008); STUNTZ, supra note 1, at 81; Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization

Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001) [hereinafter PathologicalPolitics]; William J. Stuntz,
Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEM. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1996); Lindsey
Reiser, Police Suspend Practice of 'Pretextual Stops' in Phoenix Neighborhoods, CBS 5 (Apr. 11,
2012, 12:21 AM), http://www.cbs5az.com/story/17380631/police-suspend-practice-of-pretextualstops-in-phoenix-neighborhoods [https://perma.cc/PT33-R6MD].
On harsh punishments, see DAVID KENNEDY, DON'T SHOOT 47 (2011); Marc Mauer, Racial
Impact Statements as a Means of Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities, 5 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 19, 20 (2007). See generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE 56-59 (2003).
For a brief account of parole and probation conditions, see JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN

PRISONERS COME HOME 81-83 (2003) and Joan Petersilia, Community Corrections: Probation,
Parole, and PrisonerReentry, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 499, 512-13 (James

Petersilia eds., 2011).

Q.

Wilson & Joan
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in fundamental ways. Most importantly, they provide criminal justice
officials-the police, prosecutors, and community corrections staff who
cannot possibly enforce all of these provisions to the hilt-with
enormous discretionary power to pick and choose among them. To take
the most famous example: when the traffic code becomes so complex
that few people can drive three blocks without violating it, police have a
nearly unlimited reservoir of legal authority to pull motorists over
when they want to check for fugitives and contraband (or, for that
matter, when they want to pursue any other goal ancillary to the overt
purpose of the traffic code). 4 "[C]riminal law does not function as law,"
William Stuntz famously wrote. "Rather, the law defines a menu of
options for police officers and prosecutors to use as they see fit." 5
The arbitrary and intensive use of this massive reservoir of
discretion contributes to many of the most significant concerns about
American criminal justice today, including racial discrimination by
police and prosecutors, the atmosphere of unrelenting surveillance on
many urban streets, the cavalier use of pretextual authority, and
overuse of the criminal sanction. 6 The need to control the exercise of
discretion stands out as one of the most important priorities for
criminal justice reform today. More visible problems like excessive use
of force, police killings, illegal arrests, and unconstitutional search and
detention practices obviously deserve the central place they have
occupied in the contemporary agenda for police reform. Alongside those
problems, however-and in some respects interconnected with themthe reform agenda also needs to grapple more than it has with the
problem of unfettered police discretion and the legal environment that
produces it. It needs strategies for channeling police discretion in
morally defensible ways.
This paper finds one such strategy in an unlikely place: in the
widely celebrated "focused deterrence" model of policing, which
originated in the efforts of the Boston Police Department and its
collaborators to tackle the wave of youth violence that overtook the city

4
David A. Harris, "DrivingWhile Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court
and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 558-59 (1997).
STUNTZ, supra note 1, at 4. Students of the police had made the same basic point a half-

century ago. Cf. JAMES

Q.

WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 83-89 (1968); Egon Bittner,

The Police on Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. J. SOC. 699, 702-04 (1967).
Pervasive discretion also makes criminal justice institutions resistant to reform, as frontline workers have considerable freedom to interpret central directives in ways that those who
issued them did not foresee. For historical examples, see CHRISTOPHER AGEE, STREETS OF SAN
FRANCISCO 71 (2014) and DAVID ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE (2002). For a

contemporary example, see Katherine Beckett et al., The End of an Era? Understanding the
Contradictionsof CriminalJustice Reform, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 238 (2016).
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in the 1990s. 7 The heart of the focused deterrence model lies in efforts

to identify people, places, and behaviors at which the full force of the
overbroad criminal law should be directed-for example, a problem
gang that should be targeted for strict enforcement of parole conditions
and outstanding warrants, priority prosecution for federal crimes, and
even intensive enforcement of quality of life rules like noise ordinances
and jaywalking laws. 8 Focused deterrence has most often been
understood as a strategy for controlling crime rather than advancing
justice, and some commentators have worried that it may actually
undermine justice by intensifying proactive police surveillance in
potentially troubling ways. 9 More to the present point, the focused
deterrence model seems to deliberately and unapologetically exploit the
massive reservoir of discretion that the expansive reach of the criminal
law has created. At a moment when the rule of law has deteriorated so
badly, what can possibly recommend an approach to policing that
thrives on the pretextual use of slack legal authority?
Although focused deterrence emerged out of a legal phenomenon
that is and ought to be a source of concern, I will argue that its best
examples represent an important strategy for addressing those
concerns. The focused deterrence model has the potential to channel
criminal justice discretion along more principled routes than it usually
follows, making decisions about how to use discretionary authority
more transparent, reflective, and restrained than they otherwise would
be; in the process, it has the potential to combat the inscrutable,
arbitrary, and excessive use of legal authority that over-criminalization
threatens to produce. The criminologists who have mainly discussed
the focused deterrence model have often neglected that potential;
instead they have emphasized its possible impact on crime control.
Even if that impact proves inconsistent or unknowable, the focused
deterrence model would still be worth pursuing because it can
DAVID KENNEDY ET AL.,
OPERATION CEASEFIRE 1 (2001).

REDUCING

GUN VIOLENCE: THE

BOSTON GUN

PROJECT'S

See David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a
Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449 (1996-1997).
The most explicit version of this concern comes from Elizabeth Griffiths and Johnna
Christian, who recently wrote that "[flocused deterrence is thus premised, at least in part, on the
heightened scrutiny associated with police surveillance and the state's willingness to sanction
aggressively; in Foucault's terms, gang factions are expected to self-regulate as they are
increasingly transformed into the objects of 'panoptic gaze."' ConsideringFocused Deterrence in the
Age of Ferguson, Baltimore, North Charleston, and Beyond, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POLY 573,
574 (2015) (internal citations omitted). Related concerns seem implicit in Tom Tyler, Jonathan
Jackson, and Avital Mentovich's recent critique of "proactive policing," a category that apparently
includes at least some versions of the focused deterrence model; see their article: The
Consequences of Being an Object of Suspicion: PotentialPitfalls of Proactive Police Contact, 12 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 602, 611 (2015).
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potentially help bring an increasingly lawless domain of practice under
the rule of law. At its best, it represents a judicious variety of proactive
policing that reduces the risk that criminal justice authority will be
used in arbitrary, inscrutable, and rights-violating ways. By making
this argument, I hope to add my voice to those who believe this
approach to policing still belongs on the contemporary police reform
agenda, despite the fact that this agenda has evolved dramatically
since the time when the Boston Police Department's pioneering focused
deterrence project first took shape. 10
At a more general level, I hope to extend our understanding of the
moral concerns that contemporary police reform can and should pursue.
When the criminal law reaches as broadly as it does today, the bare fact
that the law authorizes police intervention provides insufficient
warrant for the decision to intervene; as several influential scholars
have observed, there is more to good policing than mere lawfulness."
But there is also more to good policing than merely procedural justicethe leading alternative to mere lawfulness that these and other
scholars have offered as a guiding ideal for good policing. 12 What
exactly these two perspectives leave out is not easy to define, but I will
suggest that one of the missing elements involves the choices that
police make about how to use their discretionary authority to invoke

10 See, e.g., SAUL GREEN & RICHARD JEROME, CITY OF CINCINNATI INDEPENDENT MONITOR'S
FINAL REPORT 31-32, 53-55 (2008); Harold Pollack, A Crime and Policing Expert Critiques Black
Lives Matter's Police-Reform Plan, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 24, 2015, 12:12 PM), http://nymag.com/
scienceofus/20 15/08/expert-critiques-black-lives-matters-plan.html [https://perma.cc/39NB-R2UC].
" See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference Between Lawful or
Effective Policing and Rightful Policing-And Why It Matters, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1865
(2013); Tracey L. Meares et al., Lawful or Fair?How Cops and Laypeople View Good Policing (Yale
Law Sch. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 255, 2014).
1
For leading statements on procedural justice, see generally TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY
THE LAW (2006) and TOM TYLER & YUEN Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW (2002). Procedural justice

provides the theoretical foundation for the final report of the President's Task Force on 21st
Century Policing. Tom Tyler et al., The Impact of Psychological Science on Policing in the United
States: ProceduralJustice, Legitimacy, and Effective Law Enforcement, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT.
75, 76 (2015).
Procedural justice scholars have made important contributions to policing by carving out a

place for concerns about fairness and legitimacy that might otherwise have simply been ignored,
and their driving concern for dignified treatment embodies an important moral ideal. See, e.g.,
Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure, 50 NOMOS 3, 13 (2011). By
itself, however, a procedural conception of justice remains incomplete and even counterproductive.

It is wrong for police to invoke their legal authority too readily even if they do so in a procedurally
fair way, and one-sided attention to fair procedures can exacerbate rather than alleviate the
substantive injustice that accompanies them. Robin West recently expressed these concerns

eloquently: "[E]xcessively precious procedures in the face of grotesque substantive law from which
there is truly no exit, even with all the procedure in the world, can be a massive insult to dignity."
Such procedures can also be demoralizing, lending undeserved legitimacy and resilience to
substantively unjust practices,

making them "all the more invulnerable to change, whether

through politics, revolution, or subterfuge." The Limits of Process, 50 NOMOS 32, 40, 42 (2011).
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the substantive criminal law. That topic was central to policing
scholarship during the last major crisis of police legitimacy a half
century ago, but it has not been a major part of the contemporary
debates about police reform. By returning to that older body of
scholarship and tracing its legacies in contemporary practice, I hope to
revive and extend an important set of normative concerns.
Those concerns, I suggest, can be understood as aspects of our
commitment to the rule of law-not the familiar, narrow version of the
ideal that equates it with mere lawfulness or rule-following,13 but a
more complex version that concedes that discretion cannot and should
not be eliminated, yet remains committed to legal values like the
14
reduction of arbitrariness, transparency, and respect for rights. At
their best, focused deterrence projects illustrate how contemporary
policing can realize this complex but important ideal. They represent a
promising variation on a half-century old theme: the development of
administrative strategies for channeling the massive discretion that
front-line criminal justice practitioners must exercise-in this case
through deliberation among an organized group of practitioners about
how to handle a specific community problem rather than the broad
administrative rulemaking advocated in the past. By making this case,
I aim to reinterpret the focused deterrence model in terms of its
significance for the rule of law. 15
13 As expressed, for example, by Friedrich Hayek: "Stripped of all technicalities [the Rule of
Law] means that government in all its action is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand."

FRIEDRICH HAYEK, The Road to Serfdom, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF F.A. HAYEK, VOL. 2: THE

ROAD To SERFDOM 112 (2007); see also the discussion of Hayek, infra note 141.
14
See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, PoliticalJudges and the Rule of Law, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
9 (1985); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 812-19 (1989);
Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 691-94 (1991);
Lawrence Solum, Equity and the Rule of Law, 36 NOMOS 120, 120-21 (1994). More concretely,
Kathleen Noonan, Charles Sabel, and William Simon develop a complex interpretation of rule of
law values in public administration that goes well beyond simple rule-following. See generally
Kathleen Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State, 34 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY 523
(2009); Charles Sabel & William Simon, The Duty of Responsible Administration and the Problem
of Police Accountability, 33 YALE J. REG. 165 (2016).
" I do not claim that my interpretation describes what the participants themselves
consciously had in mind. A good interpretation tries to clarify the meaning of some practice, but
that enterprise is necessarily critical. If the interpretation simply restates what the participants
already think they are doing, it does not make their practices any clearer. As Charles Taylor put
it:

[I]f the explanation is really clearer than the lived interpretation then it will be such
that it would alter in some way the behavior if it came to be internalized by the agent as
his self-interpretation. In this way a hermeneutical science which achieves its goal, that
is, attains greater clarity than the immediate understanding of agent or observer, must
offer us an interpretation which is in this way crucially out of phase with the
explicandum.
Charles Taylor, Interpretationand the Sciences of Man, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES
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My argument unfolds in several stages. Sections II and III begin by
tracing the historical roots of focused deterrence back to an earlier
effort to understand and tame criminal justice discretion. First, Section
II revisits the rich body of scholarship on the problem of criminal
justice discretion that emerged in the 1960s and demonstrates the
contribution it made to Herman Goldstein's influential concept of
"problem-oriented policing." Next, Section III explains the connection
between problem-oriented policing and focused deterrence and
explicates the logic of the focused deterrence model in more detail. By
tracing this two-stage historical evolution, I aim to show that the
potential of the focused deterrence model to channel criminal justice
discretion is not an accidental byproduct of an initiative designed for
other purposes, but a legacy of its intellectual genealogy.
With this historical background in place, Sections IV and V turn to
a close examination of contemporary focused deterrence practice (as
outlined in prescriptive literature about the general model and
evaluation reports about individual initiatives) in order to understand
its potential to advance important ideals associated with the rule of
law. Section IV describes how the logic of the focused deterrence model
combats the excessive and arbitrary use of discretionary authority,
though it also describes the failure of some individual projects to follow
that logic consistently. Section V then argues that the commitment of
these projects to deterrence (rather than incapacitation or any other
mechanism of crime prevention) provides an important source of focus
and constraint. Properly understood, deterrence is not just a
mechanism of crime prevention but a moral ideal rooted in the right to
self-defense. 16 That ideal demands a commitment to rule of law values
that many focused deterrence projects have actually exhibited in
practice. Once again, some individual initiatives have not lived up to
(or even recognized) that commitment; but many have, and by
explicating it more clearly I hope to add to the prescriptive literature
about the focused deterrence model.

16, 27 (1985). As Taylor notes in another essay, this kind of interpretation is fundamentally
normative. The claim that an interpretation of a practice is a good one is more than a descriptive

claim that it captures what those engaged in it actually do; it is also a normative claim that the
interpretation enables the practice to become "less stumbling and more clairvoyant." Social Theory
as Practice, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra, at 90, 111. I have discussed this
approach to interpretive work in police research. See David Thacher, Policing is Not a Treatment:

Alternatives to the Medical Model of Police Research, 38 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 387 (2001)
[hereinafter Policingis Not a Treatment]; see generally David Thacher, The Normative Case Study,
111 AM. J. Soc. 1631 (2006); David Thacher, The Perception of Value: Adam Smith on the Moral
Role of Social Research, 19 EUR. J. Soc. THEORY 94 (2016).
' See generally Quinn, infra note 108; infra Section V.
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Section VI concludes, summarizing the potential contribution that
the focused deterrence approach can make to the police reform agenda
today.
II. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE AND THE ROOTS OF
PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING

Today, the breadth of the criminal law and the troubling discretion
it produces are associated especially with the important work of

William Stuntz and those he has influenced, but this contemporary
work continues a much older dialogue that dates back more than half a
century. Although that older body of work never engaged with certain
important aspects of the problems it considered," it did delve more
deeply than most contemporary scholarship into administrative
strategies for reasserting the rule of law. Those strategies survive,
albeit sometimes in half-forgotten and weakened forms, in the problemoriented policing model that eventually emerged from those inquiriesand through that general model in the Boston Gun Project and its
offshoots."
This body of work was set in motion in the mid-1950s by the
American Bar Foundation's (ABF's) criminal justice survey, the first
major ethnographic study of criminal justice administration in the
United States. By providing a close look at what front-line actors like
police, prosecutors, and judges actually did in several cities, the ABF
survey revealed how little the law on the books shaped their daily
work. Discretion was deep and pervasive; none of these officials could
19
be described as ministerial agents of the criminal law.

&

" In particular, older works did not consider the political economy that generates the
expansion of criminal law. Cf. Pathological Politics, supra note 2, at 510 (describing the tacit
alliance between prosecutors and legislators and the marginalization of judges that contributes to
overcriminalization).
1' The best contemporary legal scholarship relating the problem-oriented policing model to
the problem of criminal justice discretion appears in administrative law rather than criminal law.
See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 14. Further back in time, Debra Livingston's rich analysis of
administrative strategies for shaping police discretion draws from problem-oriented policing and
engages directly with the legacy of the ABF surveys, but it focuses more specifically on the order
maintenance role of the police rather than police discretion in general. See Debra
Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and
the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997) [hereinafter Quality of Life]; Debra
Livingston, Gang Loitering, the Court, and Some Realism about Police Patrol, 1999 SUP. CT. REV.
141 (1999).
Ronald Allen, Police and Substantive Rulemaking: Reconciling Principle and Expediency,
19
125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 63 (1976); see generally DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Lloyd Ohlin
Frank Remington eds., 1993) (providing an important retrospective and extension of this
literature, with comprehensive references to the original work); see also Samuel Walker, Originsof
the Contemporary CriminalJustice Paradigm:The American Bar Foundation Survey, 1953-1969, 9
JUST. Q. 47 (1992). The ABF survey's conclusions were soon reinforced by the foundational
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This discretionary character of front-line work resulted from the
nature of the criminal law. Legislatures passed broad gambling
statutes that, read literally, covered the most innocuous church lottery
or social card game, but they would never tolerate full enforcement.
The profound vagueness of major legal categories like "disorderly
conduct," which accounted for one-eighth of all arrests reported to the
FBI when the ABF studies were conducted, 20 allowed those laws to
serve as all-purpose repositories of authority on the streets. Misguided
or archaic laws remained on the books long after they had become
defunct, still available for opportunistic and undisciplined use. 21 Some
critics called for legislatures and city councils to narrow the scope of
these laws and resolve their ambiguities, 2 2 but the close look at frontline practice provided by the ABF surveys convinced most observers
that a large dose of discretion was unavoidable. Some of the vague and
overbroad laws that underwrote criminal justice discretion should
certainly be clarified or repealed, but the problems that front-line
officials had to contend with were too varied and unpredictable to fit
entirely into unambiguous and narrow laws. 2 3

ethnographies of police work, particularly the research conducted by Egon Bittner, supra note 5,

and those he influenced, especially WILSON, supra note 5.
20 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 93
(1958).
21
See generally Quality of Life, supra note 18; William 0. Douglas, Vagrancy
and Arrest on
Suspicion, 70 YALE L. J. 1 (1960).

&GORDON HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME
CONTROL 2-3 (1972); HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968) 292-95;
22

See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS

Douglas, supra note 21, at 14.
23

As Herman Goldstein put it decades
later:

Because the ABF reports described in great detail the specific incidents that the police
handled, they drew attention to the broad range of conduct commonly lumped under the

umbrella of crime. Within categories of specific crime labels (like assault, burglary, and
certainly disorderly conduct), they illustrated with unusual clarity the endless number of
unpredictable variables that distinguished one incident that the police handled from
another (e.g., the presence of mental illness, the involvement of alcohol, the relationship
between the victim and the offender, the age of the alleged offender, the prior record of
the individuals involved). The police . . . often improvised in their responses to take note
of the variables, using criteria that, depending on who reviewed them, might be praised
or condemned and with results that were equally mixed. The varied responses, viewed
neutrally, carried a strong message. They illustrated the need for flexibility in handling
the infinite variety of situations that are brought to police attention.
Herman Goldstein, Confronting the Complexity of the Police Function, in DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 23, 33-34; see also Quality of Life, supra note 18, at 575, 636-38.
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Guiding the Use of Discretion: From Rulemaking to ProblemOriented Policing

What was troubling was not that discretion existed, but that it had
been ignored. As lawmakers, administrators, judges, and academics
glossed over the need to exercise discretion at the front lines of criminal
justice practice, individual police officers and prosecutors were left to
wing it-to rely on their own instincts or the informal norms of their
occupational subcultures in order to fill in the massive gaps left by
their overbroad legal instructions. 24 That arrangement made the
exercise of discretion in criminal justice idiosyncratic and inscrutable,
and it posed a serious barrier to democratic accountability. The
problem was particularly pronounced in policing, which attracted the
lion's share of commentary in subsequent years. A decade after his
work as a staff researcher for the ABF survey, Herman Goldstein
clearly formulated the problem:
Confronted each day by frequently recurring situations for
which no guidance is provided, the individual officer either
develops his own informal criteria for disposing of matters which
come to his attention-a kind of pattern of improvisation-or
employs informal criteria which have, over a period of years,
developed within the agency of which he is a part.

. .

. [T]he

challenge is to devise procedures which will result in police
officers employing norms acceptable to society, rather than their
personal norms, in their exercise of discretion. 25
Legislators, judges, and criminal justice officials showed no ability
or enthusiasm to provide the guidance needed. Lawmakers and judges
lacked effective tools to shape important regions of front-line police
work, and police managers squandered their attention on the minutiae
of administrative procedures rather than the substance of front-line
work. 26

See Herman Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police
2
Performance,65 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1126-28 (1966); see also Walker supra note 19, at 68-69.
2 Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1127-28.
26 On the limited powers of legislators and judges, see Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not
to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE
L. J. 543, 568-69 (1959); Wayne R. LaFave & Frank J. Remington, Controlling the Police: The
Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987 (1965).
On police managers, see HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 98-100, 309-11 (1977);
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW

ENFORCEMENT AND

THE ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE,

ENFORCEMENT POLICY: THE POLICE 16-17, 42-61 (1967); Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1127.

LAW
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While the first problem-lawmakers' lack of effective toolsseemed
intractable,
the
second-police
managers'
misplaced
attention-seemed correctable in principle. A diverse chorus of criminal
justice officials and scholars soon urged police agencies to develop
administrative guidelines for the use of police authority: when to
release a juvenile delinquent to his parents; when to order a crowd to
disperse; when to use force; how to use confidential informants; and so
on.2 7 These guidelines were often framed as a solution to the "selective
enforcement" problem the ABF surveys had drawn attention to 2 8 by
providing a set of principles that police should rely on to decide when
they should and should not enforce the criminal law.
Although the chorus itself has gradually faded into the
background, Goldstein's part in it contributed important themes to his
enormously influential concept of problem-oriented policing. 29 Years
before the Crime and Delinquency article first formulated problemoriented policing explicitly, 3 0 Goldstein had already argued that police
should develop guidelines for handling the most commonly recurring
community problems they encountered, conceiving of those guidelines
as devices for shaping the discretion police exercised in their daily
work. 31 Vague and overbroad statutes authorize far more legal

27 See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 52-57, 219-29 (1969); KENNETH
CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 98-112, 139-58 (1975); accord Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling

Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and.
Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442 (1990); see also PRESIDENT'S

COMM'N, supra note 26, at 18-27; Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of
Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 813-15 (1970).
2' See Walker, supra note 19, at 61, 66-67; see also Goldstein, supra note 26 (describing the
problems inherent in selective enforcement).
29

In Confronting the Complexity of the Police Function, Goldstein traces problem-oriented

policing to the ABF surveys, as an effort to take seriously the many dimensions of the police

function's complexity that the ABF surveys uncovered. Goldstein, supra note 23, at 63-64; cf.
Walker, supra note 19, at 67-68.
The "guidelines" movement has not disappeared entirely. George Kelling has repeatedly
drawn from this tradition in his influential work on the order-maintenance role of the police. See
&

GEORGE KELLING, BROKEN WINDOWS AND POLICE DISCRETION 25-45 (1999); GEORGE KELLING
CATHERINE COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS 178-93 (1996) (framing explicitly the ordermaintenance role as an application of problem-oriented policing). See, e.g., KELLING & COLES,

supra, at 274. The guidelines movement also survives in contemporary work on the police use of
force. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER & CAROL ARCHBOLD, Critical Incident Policies, in THE NEW
WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY (2014). In general, however, police rulemaking has been
anemic and discretion remains extravagant. See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko,

&

Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1843-44 ("[R]ules adopted by democratic bodies to
govern policing tend to be few and far between.").
a Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25 CRIME
DELINQ. 236 (1979).
21
See Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1126-28; Herman Goldstein, Administrative Problems in
Controling the Exercise of Police Authority, 58 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 160, 163
(1967).
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intervention than the police ever could or should carry out, but it made
more sense to narrow their reach problem-by-problem than statute-bystatute:
Because the law, in reality, is a means to an end, selective
enforcement must be examined in the context of the various
objectives of the police. Whatever guidance a police
administrator provides his officers in deciding whether to arrest
for disorderly conduct, for example, should be contained in
broader policies on such problems as street gatherings, domestic
disputes, and public inebriates, rather than in a specific policy
32
or rule on the enforcement of the disorderly conduct statute.
More than most other members of the "guidelines" chorus,
Goldstein recognized that a decision not to invoke the law rarely meant
a decision to do nothing at all. Useful guidelines needed to consider not
only when the police should make an arrest but also when they should
turn to non-legal strategies-to the mental health service providers,
social workers, bar owners, detoxification centers, mediators, and
regulatory bodies they sometimes relied on to help handle the
community problems they encountered, as well as the informal tools
they employed on their own initiative (such as ordering a drunk patron
out of a bar or temporarily putting a gun in safekeeping). The
importance of these non-legal tools had been another important finding
of the ABF survey, and the failure to recognize it contributed to the
overuse of the criminal sanction. 33 In this respect, the guidelines
Goldstein called for were not just manuals for selective enforcement;
they also outlined the possible alternatives to legal authority in cases
when law enforcement was inappropriate.
In short, Goldstein viewed guidelines as a method of systematizing
police experience with commonly recurring community problems,
refining and disseminating what the best practitioners already knew
about the use of various legal and non-legal tools for handling those
problems. 34 Problem-oriented policing took shape as a framework for
developing and using these problem-focused guidelines. Today, the
Center for Problem-Oriented Policing's "Problem Specific Guides"
(covering problems like "Disorderly Youth in Public Places," "Domestic
Violence," and "Chronic Public Inebriation") are direct descendants of
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 26, at 95.
" See id. at 71-92.
3 Goldstein repeatedly wrote about the use of guidelines as a tool for police "to systematize
their experience so that it can be effectively communicated to new officers through training
programs and to others, like judges . . . ." Goldstein, supra note 24,at 1133.
32
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the "broader police policies" Goldstein had advocated for in the 1960s
and 1970s to guide the use of police discretion (covering topics like
"street gatherings, domestic disputes, and public inebriates").35
B.

The Consequentialist Turn in Problem-Oriented Policing

As the early focus on shaping discretion evolved into the later focus
on resolving community problems, Goldstein's writing lost some of its
emphasis on the rule of law concerns that originally inspired it. He
increasingly described criminal justice interventions as "means to an
end," suggesting to many readers that they could be evaluated
according to their success at achieving that end (for example, whether a
crackdown on gambling really did reduce other forms of crime, whether
letting the complainant decide to arrest the man who had abused her
reduced domestic abuse, and whether patterns of traffic enforcement
were well-tailored to minimize congestion and traffic accidents).
Over time, the burgeoning literature about problem-oriented
policing has devoted almost all of its attention to crime prevention
mechanisms and effects. 36 The most sophisticated work in this genre
has richly expanded the possibilities of policing practice, but it has
applied a narrowly consequentialist evaluative lens to those
innovations-i.e., it has almost exclusively asked whether problemoriented policing initiatives have reduced crime. 37 Lawrence Sherman,
one of the most influential policing scholars of the past three decades,
explicitly pressed Goldstein and his interpreters in this direction,
urging them to place even more emphasis on rigorous social science
evaluation of the long-term impact that police interventions had. 3 8
More sympathetic commentators accepted a wider range of social
scientific methodologies than Sherman did, but they implicitly stressed
the same imperative to evaluate crime prevention impacts. 39

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 26, at 95.
See, e.g., ANTHONY BRAGA, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING AND CRIME PREVENTION (2008);
CRIME REDUCTION AND PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING (Karen Bullock & Nick Tilley eds., 2012);
Anthony Braga & David Weisburd, Focused Deterrence and the Prevention of Violent Gun Injuries:
3

3

&

Practice, Theoretical Principles,and Scientific Evidence, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 55 (2015).
3 See, e.g., Anthony Braga et all, Problem-OrientedPolicing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence:
An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire, 38 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 195 (2001); Anthony
Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled
Experiment, 37 CRIMINOLOGY 541 (1999); David Weisburd et al., Is Problem-Oriented Policing
Effective in Reducing Crime and Disorder?, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POLY 139 (2010).
3 Lawrence Sherman, Problem-Oriented Policing, by Herman Goldstein, 82J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 690, 705-07 (1991) (book review).
3I

Malcolm Sparrow, Governing Science, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING 16-22 (Nat'l

Inst. Just. & Harv. Kennedy Sch., Exec. Sess. on Policing & Pub. Safety, Jan. 2011); Nick Tilley,
Whither Problem-OrientedPolicing, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 183 (2010), 191-92. Tilley has
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This approach to the study of problem-oriented policing loses sight
of the significant concerns about the rule of law that shaped its
evolution. The early concerns about unfettered police discretion lay first
and foremost in the abuse and idiosyncratic pressures it was subject
to-the temptation to let convenience or a desire to log overtime
determine whether to make an arrest, the inclination to defer to the
most vocal and powerful members of the community and slight the
interests of the marginal and voiceless, the possibility of retaliating
against those who legitimately questioned police authority, and the
scope for prejudice to drive police decision-making. It is true that by
surrendering to those pressures the police might squander an
opportunity to prevent crime more effectively. 40 But the more
immediate objection arose from the injustice of letting morally
irrelevant or morally abhorrent factors determine who would be
subjected to the burdens of police authority-or, more simply, from
allowing the exercise of discretion to remain mysterious, and therefore
unaccountable. 41
Although problem-oriented policing and the guidelines movement
that it evolved from undoubtedly aimed to overcome the "means over
ends syndrome," Goldstein's paradigms of that syndrome were not
front-line decisions that aimed to treat people fairly at the expense of
long-run crime control. They were police reforms that obsessed over
internal administrative rules: standards for uniforms and equipment,
shift change times, procedural rules for filing reports, organizational
structures, and so on. Police management had become too focused on
these bureaucratic minutiae while neglecting the work front-line
officers did in the community. The measure of that front-line work has
at least as much to do with justice and the rule of law as with crime
control. 42
By revisiting the historical roots of problem-oriented policing, we
can more easily recognize its submerged potential to help reassert the
rule of law. Goldstein's model emerged out of his efforts to grapple with
the problem of police discretion-to make the use of discretionary
usefully framed Problem-Oriented Policing as "the open-minded pursuit of ethical and effective
solutions to recurrent problems." Tilley, supra 39, at 183. The underdevelopment of the ethical
dimension in this formulation is what I mean to emphasize.
40 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 24, at 1137.
The concerns change when the police turn to non-legal interventions, but moral ideals like
4
justice, liberty, and equality remain important in those cases as well. Even the most anodyneseeming environmental interventions often implicate important social values other than
effectiveness, see, e.g., R. A. Duff & S. E. Marshall, Benefits, Burdens and Responsibilities, in
ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES IN SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 17, 19 (Andrew von

Hirsch et al. eds., 2000), and therapeutic alternatives to law enforcement obviously do so as well.
42

See Policing is Not a Treatment, supra note 15, at 391.
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authority less arbitrary, less intrusive, more reflective, and more
transparent-and it still provides an important framework for
accomplishing that goal. By encouraging front-line officers and police
managers to reflect on the recurrent situations they encounter in their
work, problem-oriented
policing stimulates explicit, principled
deliberation about how police should respond to those situations (and
perhaps prevent them from arising in the first place), rather than
leaving the response to unexamined, unaccountable habit. The
necessary deliberation is not just about what will reduce crime, but
about what is fair and consistent with other well-founded community
values.
That is a different interpretation of the point of problem-oriented
policing than the one that dominates contemporary scholarship, but
recent discussion has not ignored it entirely. Michael Scott, in
particular, has argued that contemporary accounts of problem-oriented
policing have often put too much emphasis on crime prevention:
[C]laims about the police's capacity to single-handedly reduce
crime, disorder and fear at the community or higher level are
simply not warranted. The greatest promise of problem-oriented
policing may be that it is the approach most likely to maintain
the delicate balance between freedom and order, and minimize
the likelihood that police actions will undermine their legitimacy
in society. This is so largely because the problem-oriented
approach rejects the very excessive reliance on the enforcement
of criminal law, and the use of force that accompanies it, that so
often leads to abuse and consequent erosion of public trust in
the police. 43
Sixteen years later, these observations are even more compelling.
The more thoroughly consequentialist interpretation of problemoriented policing arose during an era of high-crime rates, when
concerns about public safety reached crisis levels and pressure mounted
for the criminal justice system to take aggressive action. 44 It is perhaps
not surprising that the finer points of the rule of law in the exercise of
police discretion faded from view in that context. Now that criminal

43

MICHAEL ScoTT, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST 20 YEARS 129

(2000).
14
Goldstein opened Problem-OrientedPolicing with his worries about whether "a somewhat
theoretical concept for improving policing" would seem frivolous in the shadows of the drug crisis
that most urban areas were struggling with at the turn of the decade, and it is hard not to wonder
how his presentation was shaped by a felt need to speak to the crisis of public safety in the late

1980s. HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING xi (1990).
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justice overreach has overtaken crime as a major policy concern, we
might reasonably look more closely at the contemporary offshoots of
problem-oriented policing for hints about its continuing potential to
help resolve the problems that set its development in motion.
III. THE BOSTON GUN PROJECT

Nearly four decades after Goldstein first formulated the idea of
problem-oriented policing, the Boston Gun Project4 5 stands out as its
most distinguished application. 46 The project and its descendants
illustrate the potential for problem-oriented policing to channel
criminal justice discretion in constructive and defensible ways, and by
doing so to address some of the concerns about the rule of law that
ultimately gave birth to it.
The Boston Gun Project took shape in 1995 during a surge in youth
violence in the city. Boston police, Harvard researchers, community
outreach workers, state and federal prosecutors, and community
corrections officers spent months meeting and analyzing criminal
justice records to understand more clearly what kind of incidents
comprised the wave of youth violence. This Working Group undertook a
detailed review of every known youth homicide in the city over the past
four years, drawing on the street knowledge of police, outreach
workers, probation officers, and the offenders they interviewed to
understand how and why each incident had unfolded. Over the course
of several months, the group gradually developed a picture of the youth
violence problem. It was not the "huge, amorphous, and deeply rooted"
problem portrayed in popular discussion about youth violence in the
1990s, according to project director David Kennedy, but a clearly
defined and highly structured one: a few dozen active youth gangs
entangled in a longstanding cycle of vendettas. "[F]or all practical
purposes, this was Boston's youth violence problem: a few score groups,
already well known, made up of shockingly active offenders, many of
them already well known, hurting each other along already very wellknown vectors of group vendetta." 47 The intervention that the Working
Group developed to tackle this problem came to be known as
"Operation Ceasefire."

4
The National Institute of Justice funded the Gun Project work as a problem-oriented
policing initiative focused on youth violence. See DAVID KENNEDY, DON'T SHOOT 30 (2011).
46
In 2000, Scott described the gun project as "the best example of high-level problem
analysis." SCOTT, supra note 43, at 118. A decade later, Tilley described that initiative and its
offshoots as "[perhaps] the best examples we have so far" of analytically sophisticated problemoriented policing. Tilley, supra note 39, at 192.
4
KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 43.
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The fact that known, high-rate, well-organized offenders were
responsible for most of Boston's youth violence was an indictment of
existing criminal justice strategies, but it was also an opportunity:
these offenders had parole conditions and outstanding warrants, they
were suspects in cold cases that could be reopened, and they regularly
violated a wide range of new laws-everything from trespassing and
public drinking to driving without a license. 48 Whenever law
enforcement officials chose to do so, they could immediately bring
coordinated attention to any given group in a devastating way,
gathering together all the available discretionary authority and
directing it towards a precisely defined target: violence committed by
the small number of groups responsible for most of Boston's serious
crime. "It was narrow-don't shoot," Kennedy recalls.
The normal frame said, don't be in gangs, don't commit crimes,
don't sell drugs, don't carry weapons, don't violate your
probation, don't drink and drug. Turn your life around. Go back
to school, get a job. Go forth and sin no more. This cut to the
chase: Don't hurt people. Say any more-don't carry guns, don't
sell drugs, don't recruit kids into your gang-you couldn't back it
up. There was just too much of it, and too little of us. Draw those
lines in the sand, they would cross them, and it would be
obvious that the cops had lied. They were used to being lied to,
lying to them was normal: The next time you drop a hot urine
I'm going to violate you, don't let me see you back in my court,
young man. Our side lied all the time. It was like we were
training them to ignore us. This was focused, limited. We
started to call it "focused deterrence": focused on one problem,
focused on the core offenders. 49
Within the larger universe of violent groups, just a few stood out at
any given moment. "Most groups didn't kill anybody on any given day,
month, year; those who were hot stood out very clearly."50 At the
beginning of Ceasefire, the active group was the Vamp Hill Kings.
Having identified their target, officials served outstanding warrants,
reopened cold cases, ordered drug tests, enforced curfews, raised bail
requests, pursued federal cases, fast-tracked state cases, and even
initiated deportation proceedings. The Kings eventually stopped

48
David Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of
Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 461-62 (1997).

49

KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 54.

5o Id. at 55.
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5 1
fighting, and when another group started up, the process repeated. In
this way, the Working Group followed outbreaks of violence from one
group to the next, deciding which one would receive concentrated
criminal justice attention at any point in time by continually assessing
its best intelligence about which gangs were currently active and using
that intelligence to target its discretionary authority.
As enforcement came down hard on one group after another, the
Working Group explicitly communicated what it was doing to its
targets. "We're here because of the shooting," criminal justice officials
announced. "We're not going to leave until it stops. And until it does,
nobody is going to so much as jaywalk, nor make any money, nor have
any fun." 52 Much of this communication took place in special forums
convened for the purpose. Community corrections officers and other law
enforcement required or invited specific offenders to attend open
meetings with themselves, police, streetworkers, prosecutors, and
community leaders. Law enforcement officials enumerated the powers
53
at their disposal and what would lead them to use those powers. This
communication was important because so much of the enforcement was
pretextual. "The papers say this was a drug operation, and it was,"
officials explained of one crackdown. "[B]ut it really happened because
of the violence, and it's violence that will draw anything similar in the
future." 54
The Working Group brought this message to a wide audience.
Although the enforcement crackdowns were only launched against
groups that had broken the no-violence rule, the forums were convened
for gangs that had not recently been active to tell them what response
they could expect if they became active. In particular, once a violent
group had been quieted, the Working Group tried to warn its rivals
that they would be next unless they put down their guns. In that way,
the message traveled across the city's gang landscape along the existing
55
network of vendettas.

"' Id. at 60-70. But see DAVID KENNEDY ET AL., REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE: THE BOSTON GUN

PROJECT'S OPERATION CEASEFIRE 33-34 (2001). The two accounts seem to give slightly different
chronologies for the Vamp Hill Kings and Intervale Posse crackdowns, presumably because in
practice the two initiatives overlapped.
52

KENNEDY ET AL., supra note 51, at 27-28. The quotation comes from a description of an

earlier project that Ceasefire was modeled on, but Ceasefire itself adopted the same basic
message.
53 To make the point vivid, they drew attention to exemplary cases like Freddie Cardoza, a
gang leader sentenced to nineteen years in federal prison under an armed career criminal law

after he was stopped on the street with a single bullet (he was not even carrying a gun). Id. at 3538.
4 Id. at 40.
5

KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 58.
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Widely celebrated, the Boston Gun Project inspired dozens of
imitators over the next two decades. Many of them were sponsored by
the federal Department of Justice, first under the research-heavy
Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative and later under
the U.S. Attorney-led Project Safe Neighborhoods. I will refer to these
projects collectively as "focused deterrence" initiatives. Some followed
Boston's lead closely, others elaborated the model in innovative new
directions, others fell down in the fact of intractable implementation
challenges, and some just seemed to miss the point. Underneath these
variations, however, all of them were deliberately exploiting the
discretion inherent in today's criminal law.
The police, prosecutors, and community corrections officers
involved in these initiatives did not create that discretion; it is a
feature of the legal landscape they inhabit. The most productive
question to pose about their work is not whether overcriminalization is
desirable but, given its existence, how the discretion it generates can
most legitimately be used. Because of the diverse forms the Gun
Project's descendants have taken over the past two decades, they
illustrate both the promise and perils of the focused deterrence model
as an administrative device for channeling police discretion, and
thereby for advancing the rule of law in a legal environment where it
has become precarious.
IV. REASSERTING THE RULE OF LAW
Like all well-crafted problem-oriented policing initiatives, the
focused deterrence model channels criminal justice discretion by
making decisions about how to use it more reflectively and
transparently-by making those decisions the focus of explicit choices
in collaborative working groups devoted to the resolution of significant
community problems, rather than tacit choices by isolated individuals.
That deliberative process and the practices that emerge from it have
the potential to advance rule of law values in several ways. To clarify
that potential, this section and the next one will consider how well
focused deterrence initiatives have addressed the main concerns that
recent critics of overcriminalization have emphasized. Those concerns
capture some of the most important aspects of the rule of law that are
threatened by the contemporary criminal justice regime.
The most basic problem with the broad reach of the criminal law is
the way it facilitates excessive and arbitrary use of the criminal
sanction. By definition, overbroad laws prohibit more behavior than
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their underlying rationale really requires.5 6 The most direct concern
about such laws is that they may ensnare behavior that doesn't really
warrant punishment, or at least not such severe punishment: they
produce injustice by punishing too many people, too harshly. The use of
57
drug laws as a proxy for drug-related violence illustrates the problem.
As Stuntz observes:
Drug crimes were not solely proxy crimes; a large fraction of
incarcerated drug offenders . . . were suspected of drug crimes
and nothing else. But the laws authorizing their punishment
were designed with violent offenders in mind. So nonviolent
drug offenders were, in effect, punished both for the crimes they
committed and for the violence of the drug markets in which
they participated. . . . The use of drug crime as a (partial) proxy
for violence amounted to a sentencing enhancement, and a
58
dramatic one at that, for black drug crime.
In this way an overbroad legal tool designed to tackle a more
specific problem (drug market violence, rather than drug markets
themselves) spills over the boundaries that were supposed to contain it.
Overinclusive laws also contribute to arbitrary punishment-to
differences in treatment that result from accidents of fate, caprice, and
other morally irrelevant factors. "When the criminal justice system
overcriminalizes," Douglas Husak observes, "no discernable principle
distinguishes those persons who are punished from those who are
not." 59 For example, when Rudolph Giuliani served as a federal
prosecutor in New York City, he randomly selected one day a week
when all street-level drug dealers would be prosecuted in federal court,
where they would likely receive much more severe sentences than they
would have received in state court. Husak comments:
Despite the notorious difficulties implementing a principle of
proportionality,. no person would contend that the same criminal
behavior becomes more serious and should be punished more

HUSAK, supranote 2, at 154.
They are convenient tools for combating drug-related violence because the drug laws have
become essentially strict liability offenses. Conviction is nearly automatic, unlike the violent
offenses they serve as pretexts for. See MARKUS DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME 34 (2003);
STUNTZ, supra note 1, at 269-74. "Proxy laws" as Stuntz describes them are a species of overbroad
laws: the implicit criterion that defines the subset of cases that ought to be pursued is something
like "those in which we believe the offender has committed a hard-to-prove violent offense as well."
5

7

5

STUNTZ, supra note 1, at 273.

6

Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL

THEORY 624 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2010).
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harshly because it happens to be perpetrated on a Tuesday
rather than on a Wednesday-especially when notice is
deliberately withheld about the date on which the longer
sentences will be imposed.6 0
The concern here is not that these randomized crackdowns are
ineffective; they may be very effective. 61 The concern is that such a
strategy deliberately imposes far more severe punishments on some
people than others for morally irrelevant reasons. 62 The example
provides a paradigmatic case of the arbitrary element in the
enforcement of overbroad laws, illustrating a pervasive phenomenon in
an especially vivid way.
A major virtue of the focused deterrence model lies in the way it
combats these twin problems of excessive and arbitrary enforcement.
The central thrust of the strategy is precisely to redirect discretionary
criminal justice authority towards the most significant acts of violence
(or other significant community problems) and away from the
haphazard enforcement of whichever violations of the law happen to
come to official attention. Early in the Boston Gun Project, community
outreach workers complained about the heavy federal sanctions that
prosecutors intended to pursue:
In one particularly tense exchange, an older Streetworker asked,
"Is everybody who might sell drugs on the street facing these
huge Federal penalties? My son, God forbid, might choose to do
a little of that; is he going to be exposed?" "No," [U. S. Attorney
Don] Stern replied. "This is about violence. Only the key players
in the most violent groups have to worry, and they'll get fair
warning, just like Intervale did." 63
That response reflects the outcome of the Working Group's
deliberations, which aimed to decide in a principled and explicit way
how available discretion should be used. Each focused deterrence
project begins with a detailed analysis of the nature of the crime
problem in a particular community in order to identify the most

HUSAK, supra note 2, at 28-29 (internal citations omitted).
See Jan Eeckhout et al., A Theory of Optimal Random Crackdowns, 100 AM. ECON. REV.
1104 (2010); Lawrence Sherman, Police Crackdowns: Initials and Residual Deterrence, 12 CRIME
JUST. 1 (1990).
6

&

6'

"

For Bernard Harcourt,

this randomization strategy has its own virtues. See AGAINST

PREDICTION 237-39 (2007). Most commentators, however, seem to share Husak's concern. Husak
himself concedes that the strategy is perfectly legal, but its moral propriety is a different question.
HUSAK, supra note 2, at 29.
63

KENNEDY ETAL., supra note 51, at 40.
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significant threats to the community's viability": what those problems

are and who exactly are responsible for them. Participants undertake
close scrutiny of relevant incident reports, pool the existing street
knowledge of field officers, and conduct new investigations to answer
these questions. 65 At its best, the result provides a more informed
picture of who contributes to significant community problems than
criminal justice officials normally consult. Cincinnati Police Chief
Thomas Streicher drew this contrast as he reflected on his
department's own experience with focused deterrence: "Do you want to
go out every day and arrest 50 crack heads with 50 crack pipes and fill
up the court system? .

.

. Or do you want to bring in three tenths of 1%

66
of the population that were responsible for the homicides?"
Recent efforts to apply the focused deterrence model to overt drug
markets illustrate the pattern most vividly. By systematically
scrutinizing officials' initial assumptions about who sustains those drug
markets, they have repeatedly discovered that some of those
assumptions are flawed. Kennedy summarizes the experience of law
enforcement in High Point, North Carolina, where street drug markets
had become a major concern in several neighborhoods, particularly the
city's West End neighborhood:

Marty Sumner and Larry Casterline started figuring out who
the drug dealers in the West End were. The High Point police
had been doing sweeps there, month after month, for years;
Marty Sumner and the narcotics guys knew there were
hundreds of dealers. But as they'd promised, they hunkered
down and did their homework. Patrol and narcotics officers
reported who they thought were active. The police department
reached out to probation and parole officers, asked them the
same question. They pulled incident reports for the West End
violent and drug crimes, identified offenders, checked and crosschecked their associates in criminal history databases . . Marty
Sumner assigned each apparent dealer to a narcotics

" The criterion of "what is the greatest threat to community viability" is Kennedy's.
Kennedy, supra note 45, at 225-30. One can imagine other criteria for choosing problems. See, e.g.,
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 26, at 95-100. Many focused deterrence initiatives do not seem very
reflective about this issue, but youth violence is so obviously significant that perhaps it does not
require much reflection.
6'

For detailed accounts of the most important analytic approaches, see TIM BYNUM ET AL.,

CHRONIC VIOLENT OFFENDER STRATEGIES: A PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS STRATEGIC
INTERVENTION (2002); SCoTT DECKER ET AL., GUN PROSECUTION CASE SCREENING: A PROJECT
SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS STRATEGIC INTERVENTION (2006); JOHN KLOFAS ET AL., CRIME INCIDENT
REVIEWS: A PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS STRATEGIC INTERVENTION (2006).
6

KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 246.
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investigator. You're going to be the expert on this person, he
said. Figure it all out. Is he really dealing? How much? Inside or
outside? How extensive is his record? Is he violent? . . . The
answer was not what they expected. The answer was: Sixteen
dealers . . . Larry Casterline [said,] "This exercise helped officers
realize that they may have been directing enforcement action
toward individuals who lived in and around the drug market but
who were not actually involved in it."67
The whole thrust of focused deterrence initiatives is to avoid the
excessive and arbitrary use of criminal justice authority by focusing
discretionary enforcement on those offenders that careful investigations
have determined to be most responsible for significant community
problems. 68
Even within that targeted group, focused deterrence aims to
minimize the use of enforcement authority. The early literature on
criminal justice discretion and the idea of problem-oriented policing
that emerged from it both stress the wide range of alternatives to
arrest that police have available to them. In his most recent work,
Kennedy stresses the massive burden that American law enforcement
has imposed on black communities, and he embraces a moral and
strategic imperative to combat crime in ways that minimize it.6 9 In
High Point, police pursued that goal by "banking" cases against the
majority of the sixteen active dealers they identified in the West End
neighborhood. They conducted surveillance and undercover buys that

" Id. at 167-68. The implementation guide developed by the Bureau of Justice Assistance for
drug market interventions like High Point stresses the importance of defining and identifying
significant and active dealers. NATALIE HIPPLE & ED MCGARRELL, BJA DRUG MARKET
INTERVENTION IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE AND LESSONS LEARNED 5, 9-11 (2009).
`
The explicit, deliberative process that focused deterrence initiatives rely on does not simply
correct inaccurate assumptions, such as the hangers-on mistaken for high-rate drug dealers or the
mere "crack heads" who have nothing to do with serious violence. It also encourages principled
decisions about the kinds of problems that deserve concentrated criminal justice attention in the

first place. Crackdowns that make intensive (and even draconian) use of all available legal tools
are common in criminal justice, but in the normal course of events, community pressure and

traditional departmental practices determine how this substantial reservoir of authority will be
deployed. Focused deterrence initiatives reopen that question for deliberate reflection. (In that
respect it perfectly illustrates Goldstein's early idea that default uses of discretion arise out of
police subculture and community pressure, while guidelines might make it more principled.) For
example, Kennedy compares Ceasefire's intensive response to gang violence with the common

response to an assault against a police officer. KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 56. In Boston, the
Working Group raised the question of whether similar crackdowns might be directed at other
targets. "You know what happens when someone kills a cop," Working Group members told one

gang. "We go after everybody involved, we never back off, we never stop. That's what we're going
to do if you guys hurt somebody. That's what we're going to do if somebody hurts you. Hurting you
is like hurting a cop. It's all off-limits now." Id. at 65-66.
69 KENNEDY, supra note
45, at 140-48.
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would have justified an indictment, but then held these cases in
abeyance, convening a "call-in" where authorities warned the dealers
that they would be arrested immediately on the banked evidence unless
they stopped dealing. The strategy aimed to achieve effective
deterrence by transforming the very low risk of arrest for any given
drug sale under conventional policing practices into a near certainty.
By doing so, however, it also sought to minimize the use of enforcement
authority by making the threat so credible that it would never need to
be carried out.70

In the meantime, the decision to bank viable cases demonstrated
restraint to the community. "[I]t was a graphic and concrete way to
show the community, dealers, and their families that the views they
had of law enforcement as conspiring to harm the community and
control young black men is wrong," Kennedy maintains.7 1 One NAACP
leader in nearby Winston-Salem seemed to agree, telling the audience
at an open community meeting: "I never would have believed that the
police would hold our young men in their hands, able to put them in
prison, and not do it."72 A federal public defender involved in the High
Point initiative added: "[I]f this helps turn things around, it's going to
be the start of treating people better. Of talking to people first, and
arresting as a last resort."73 To the extent that strategic use of
discretion allows officials to forgo enforcement even where it would be
justified, it not only avoids the application of overbroad laws to cases
where their underlying rationale does not apply, it also restricts the use
of legal authority even among cases to which that rationale does
apply.74
In High Point and other drug market interventions, not all cases
are banked. The most serious offenders are arrested and prosecuted
immediately. The decisions about which cases warrant forbearance
once again raise concerns about arbitrary and excessive enforcement.
"What about everybody else you didn't treat this way," one community
member wondered aloud at a Providence call-in. 75 The question seemed
especially apt in Providence. Officials had identified 104 dealers driving
the targeted drug market, but seventy-one were arrested immediately
70

Mark Kleiman stresses this aspect of the High Point intervention in WHEN BRUTE FORCE

FAILS 45-48 (2009).
71

DAVID KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION 154 (2009).

72

Id. at 154-55.

7

KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 176.

In other words, even where it would be authorized by a narrower analogue to the existing
overinclusive law--one that is "no more extensive than necessary to achieve its objective." HUSAK,
supra note 2, at 153.
7

75

KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 193.
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simply because they were not from the neighborhood, and twenty-six
more were arrested because they had a record of violence or guns. Only
seven dealers remained to invite to the call-in-"The Lucky Seven," as
participants came to call them. 76 That label perfectly captures the
concern about arbitrary enforcement: that nothing but luck determines
who will suffer the full force of the criminal law. Should a dealer's
neighborhood of residence determine whether he is invited to the call-in
for a warning rather than arrested? Should any history of violence or
illegal gun possession disqualify a dealer from the call-ins?
The large literature on the implementation of the focused
deterrence model has recognized the significance of these questions.
The U.S.
Department of Justice "Drug Market Intervention
Implementation Guide" calls for extensive deliberation about the
criteria that will be used to decide which cases will be banked and
which pursued immediately, observing: "Defining specific criteria will
allow you to respond to questions about why one person was offered a
second chance and another person was not."7 7 The Project Safe
Neighborhood "Chronic Violent Offender" strategy handbook similarly
encourages focused deterrence working groups to articulate clear and
explicit criteria to reduce the potential for bias, and it calls for a
comprehensive effort to gather relevant evidence to determine which
offenders or groups satisfy those criteria.7 8 This process of articulating
explicit and defensible criteria and applying them systematically is
what distinguishes focused deterrence initiatives from more casual
exercise of criminal justice discretion. By providing a forum for doing
that-a forum whose whole purpose is to deliberate about the best use
of discretionary authority-focused deterrence combats the arbitrary
and excessive use of the criminal law.
There are many ways in which this process can fall short of the
ideal that defines it. Most simply, projects may fail to develop or use
any clear criteria at all. In Los Angeles, Operation Ceasefire directed
police and prosecutorial discretion toward two youth gangs throughout

7

Id. at 192.

7

HIPPLE & MCGARRELL, supra note 67, at 13.
For example:

7

One of the initial decisions that needs to be made is selection of the criteria that will be
used to determine who is a chronic violent gun offender. What does it take to be included
in the group of individuals who are determined to be 'impact players'? Whatever criteria
are selected should be applied in a standard and consistent fashion. In addition, a broad
spectrum of data sources on offenders should be examined. The exclusive use of
intelligence sources may omit some individuals who are deserving of being included with
this group of offenders.
BYNUM ET AL., supra note 65, at 6.
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the project, and published reports seem to indicate that those targets
were chosen largely based on community input at an early open
meeting. A few days after that meeting, a particularly brazen shooting
in the heart of the territory of one of the two gangs became a
"triggering event" that mobilized enforcement action against the gang's
members.79 Shootings by different gangs the week after this triggering
event received no additional attention from the Ceasefire working
group.80 Instead, the two gangs originally selected as targets remained
the focus of attention for the life of the project, based only on the views
expressed by community members at the early project meeting, as well
as the brazen shooting by one of the two gangs that happened to take
place shortly thereafter. It is hard to distinguish that sequence of
events from the crackdowns police have always mounted in response to
community pressure. At their best, focused deterrence projects make
deliberate and informed decisions about where discretionary authority
should be directed rather than falling back on the potentially arbitrary
forces of habit or unexamined community pressure.8 1
The mere existence of enforcement criteria is not the only
necessary condition in this process. Explicit criteria do little to advance
the rule of law if those criteria are inconsistent with community values
or substantively indefensible. (Giuliani's "Federal Day" relied on an
explicit criterion, but one that was obviously morally irrelevant.)
Reasonable people will often disagree about whether any particular
criterion is appropriate, so controversy can never be eliminated from
these judgments. 82 In these cases transparency and democratic
accountability are particularly important, since the appropriate
substantive criteria are contested.
In many projects, however, it seems clear that administrative
convenience and data availability exert too much influence on case
selection. To identify the most serious offenders in a neighborhood,
some projects have relied entirely on easily available criminal history
files, assuming that the worst offenders are the ones with the longest
rap sheets. More sophisticated projects have recognized that these data
may provide an incomplete perspective, missing recent offenses that
still linger in the court system and giving too much weight to old
79

GEORGE TITA ET AL., REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE: RESULTS FROM AN INTERVENTION IN EAST

Los ANGELES 15-16 (2011).
* Id. at 18.
8
Community input can and should play a role in those decisions, but the spontaneous
demands of those who happen to attend a one-time community meeting cannot determine their
outcome alone. See generally David Thacher, Equity and Community Policing: A New View of
Community Partnerships,20 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (2001).
82
I advance one moral framework for approaching these judgments in the next section.
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offenses, and failing to account for the varying seriousness of each
offense. 83 Others rely uncritically on criminal justice labels, for
example, by treating all "gun" crimes the same without distinguishing
between possession and use. 8 4 More complex algorithms for identifying
serious offenders calculate weighted point totals, assigning a
seriousness score to each prior offense and summing all offense scores
for each offender (or occasionally applying a more complex weighting
system). These approaches strive to avoid bias and discrimination, 85 but
they may introduce new problems. Formulaic "weights" may understate
the challenge of commensurating different crimes; 86 organizational
records may provide a distorted picture of the reality they purport to
describe;8 7 and point systems may serve to justify the police practices
that created the data they rely on in the first place.8 8 These problems
indicate that the aura of objectivity surrounding data-driven decisionmaking may be exaggerated, and it is surely correct to insist on
subjecting its conclusions to a reality check.89 The need for judgment
cannot be eliminated; professional and community input can be
disciplined but not ignored.
Other projects have used the availability of federal charges in
deciding whom to arrest and prosecute in order to maximize "impact." 90
Since federal laws are especially notorious for overbreadth, that

83

See, e.g., BYNUM ET AL., supra note 65, at 36.

8

But cf. id. at 7.

8

Id. at 6, 8, 26.

8

For example, even if gun possession offenses receive lower scores than use offenses, does it

really make sense for three possession offenses to outweigh a single shooting offense? Should an
offender ever be able to qualify for targeted attention based on a long string of possession offenses
alone? For a general discussion of commensurability and valuation in non-criminal law, see Cass
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation: Some Applications in Law, in
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 234 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).

See Harold Garfinkel & Egon Bittner, "Good" Organizational Reasons For "Bad" Clinic
Records, in STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 186, 195-96 (1967). The focused deterrence literature

specifically notes how plea bargaining may affect the meaning of criminal history files. See BYNUM
ET AL., supra note 65, at 7.

* Sarah Brayne, Stratified Surveillance: Policing in the Age of Big Data (2015) (unpublished
Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton Univ. Dept. of Sociology) (on file with author) ("Despite the stated
intent of the points system to redress some of the inequalities and bias in police practices, datadriven surveillance can actually exacerbate pre-existing inequalities in insidious ways because it
puts individuals already under suspicion under new and deeper forms of surveillance, while

appearing to be objective, or, in the words of one captain, 'just math."').
*

As recommended

technology-

in BYNUM

and data-driven

ET AL.,

supra note 65,

at 13. For general critiques of

policing, see David Sklansky, The Persistent Pull of Police

Professionalism, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING 8-12 (Nat'l Inst. Just. & Harv. Kennedy Sch.,

Exec. Sess. on Policing & Pub. Safety, Mar. 2011); and Petra Bartosiewicz, Beyond the Broken
Window, HARPER'S (May 2015), http//harpers.org/archive/2015/05/beyond-the-broken-window/
[perma.cc/JKJ4-RZ2N].
9

See BYNUM ET AL., supra note 65, at 1, 19.
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criterion is probably perverse. For years the Boston Gun Project was
presented as a more nuanced alternative to Project Exile, which
effectively pursued full enforcement of certain federal gun laws in the
jurisdictions that adopted it.91 The zero-tolerance spirit animating that
initiative is diametrically opposed to the discretionary spirit of the Gun
Project. As I have stressed throughout, the fundamental premise of
focused deterrence as an application of problem-oriented policing is
that vague and overbroad sources of legal authority cannot and should
not be enforced to the letter; they demand situated judgments about
whether the motivation behind them will be well-served in a particular
case. The main virtue of the focused deterrence model-the forum it
provides to make those situated judgments in an informed way-is
undermined when a working group adopts any such rigid rule.
Because these judgments about how discretion should be
channeled can be momentous-including a near-certainty of a decadeslong prison term-they demand extraordinary care. The information
they rely on will not typically be vetted by a court according to
traditional rules of evidence and due process (though of course the
cases they eventually lead to will be). Informal talk about the basis of
these quasi-judicial judgments can be jarring. "We almost always know
who did it," Kennedy says of the triggering incidents that drove
decision-making in Boston. "[W]e may not be able to prove it, to take it
to a prosecutor, but we know." 92 The source of such knowledge has
included jailhouse informants, streetworkers, community members,
and vice officers. 93 As many participants and commentators have
recognized, there is a moral imperative to scrutinize the quality and
relevance of this information, even if the appropriate standards remain
unclear. 94 The rules of evidence for formal adjudication are extensive;
those for the exercise of discretionary judgment are almost nonexistent.
Because they make the basis of those judgments explicit, focused

91 See generally Daniel Richman, Project Exile and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement
Authority, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 369 (2001).
* KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 35.
9

See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 71, at 116; KLOFAS ET AL., supra note 65, at 17 (using

jailhouse focus groups to identify important drug houses).
One U.S. Department of Justice guide insists: "Given that this information will form the
94
basis of enforcement and prosecution efforts, it is critical that it be accurate." BYNUM ET AL., supra
note 65, at 13. In the text I want to stress the need to press harder on what the norm of "accuracy"
requires. Greater skepticism should undoubtedly apply to evidence favoring enforcement than
evidence favoring lenience. Concerns undoubtedly multiply when both the accuracy and moral
relevance of a particular piece of information is in question. How should a working group treat a
youth worker's claim that a flagged offender has recently re-enrolled in school, a probation
official's claim that an offender has joined back up with the group that originally got him in
trouble, or a community leader's claim that an overlooked offender is a danger to the community?
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deterrence initiatives have the potential to catalyze reflection on this
crucial domain of practice, and thereby make the exercise of discretion
less arbitrary.
V. THE MORALITY OF DETERRENCE
Critics of overcriminalization have also raised a deeper and more
substantive concern than those I have considered so far, and by
examining it briefly I hope to clarify another valuable feature of the
best focused deterrence projects. The concern I have in mind is best
(and most apocalyptically) expressed by Markus Dubber. For Dubber,
the staggering reach of modern American criminal law creates the
conditions of a police state, expanding discretion so broadly that
criminal justice officials have nearly unconstrained authority. 95 In that
environment, sovereign power more closely resembles the power of the
patriarch over his servile dependents than the power of a legitimate
government over free and autonomous subjects. 96 At best, in today's
America, this potentially boundless power is subject to norms of
efficiency: it doles out punishment in a way that will maximize crime
prevention-particularly
through selective incapacitation of the
dangerous, but potentially through opportunistic deterrence and
rehabilitation as well. "Offenses simply lay the foundation for an
assessment of dangerousness," Dubber writes. "In their very
malleability lies their value. It's this malleability that makes room for
the discretionary dangerousness assessments at the heart of the
system."97 In this way overcriminalization promotes the advance of
utilitarian ideals and undermines justice. It is fundamentally
antagonistic to respect for rights and dignity, viewed as substantive
limits on the state's authority over its subjects. 98 Powerful sovereigns

" See MARKUS DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 175-76 (2005) [hereinafter POLICE POWER]. Dubber focuses particularly
on so-called "possession" offenses, which are a central plank of overcriminalization. DUBBER, supra

note 57, at 14-16, 32-97; see also HUSAK, supra note 2, at 44.
96 See generally POLICE POWER, supra note 95. A similar perspective underlies E.P.
Thompson's famous account of the rule of law: "[T]here is a difference between arbitrary power
and the rule of law. We ought to expose the shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath

this law. But the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the
defence [sic] of the citizen from power's all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an unqualified
human good." WHIGS AND HUNTERS 266 (1975).
9

DUBBER, supra note 57, at 21.

'

For that conception, see especially Rawls's famous statement: "Each person possesses an

inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override." A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971). Ronald Dworkin argues that the rule of law requires respect for
substantive rights in Political Judges and the Rule of Law, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note

14, at 32.
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may decide to exercise mercy from time to time, but the optional
exercise of mercy is no substitute for the systematic recognition of
individual rights. This danger arises even for impeccably democratic
sovereigns, since a democratic majority can ride roughshod over
individual rights almost as easily as an autocrat can.
Some may be unmoved by this concern. Yes, they will say, that is
exactly what we hope to accomplish: case-by-case assessment of
dangerousness in order to prevent crime as effectively as possible. (The
popularity of this view explains why democratic accountability alone
cannot address this concern.) It is not hard to find this utilitarian
perspective in the literature about focused deterrence, which is often
unapologetic in its desire to harness any available authority to
eliminate significant community problems. Although it is sometimes
qualified in practice, the idea that the end justifies the means often
lurks beneath the surface of projects launched to combat major crises
like rampant youth homicide. Regardless, these initiatives have been
deliberately engineered to maximize deterrence, and for that reason it
may appear that they cannot avoid treating people like "tigers . .. in a
circus," as Andrew von Hirsch memorably put it-"as beings that have
to be restrained, intimidated, or conditioned into compliance" -rather
than as real moral agents. 99 Even the appeals to conscience commonly
included in focused deterrence call-ins (typically conveyed by those who
belong to the offenders' families and communities) are a deliberate part
of a strategy to maximize the combined force of formal and informal
sanctions. 100 The recent interest in procedural justice among focused
deterrence projects is also often justified and motivated, and therefore
bounded, by a desire to maximize compliance and respect for the law; it,
too, often takes shape as a pragmatic accommodation to maximize
crime prevention rather than an independent moral ideal rooted in
respect for persons. 101
All of that is to say that focused deterrence hardly seems to
of
bath
corrosive
the
against
rights
individual
galvanize
overcriminalization. And yet, in practice some of the most prominent
focused deterrence projects have refused to exploit all available
discretion in the name of effective crime control, and particularly to
(such as selective
employ prototypically utilitarian strategies

"

ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 11 (1996).

KENNEDY, supra note 71, at 119-20.
See Austin Sarat, Authority, Anxiety, and Procedural Justice: Moving from Scientific
Detachment to Critical Engagement, 27 LAw & SOc'Y REV. 647, 656 (1993) (reviewing TOM TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990)); David Thacher, Perils of Value Neutrality, 44 RES. Soc. ORG.
317 (2015).
10

10'
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incapacitation of the dangerous) that other moral frameworks
condemn. For example, in April 2007, several Cincinnati politicians
used criminal history databases to assemble a list of "likely killers" and
called on the city's emerging focused deterrence initiative (the
Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence, or CIRV) to direct
concentrated enforcement at the members of the list.102 Civil rights
advocates immediately criticized the proposal, 103 and the CIRV working
group agreed. Kennedy's response is hard to parse: "It's not our list,
criminologists have spent generations trying to do this kind of
prediction, it doesn't work, we have nothing to do with this, we said,
over and over."10 4 The rationale expressed here seems narrow: the best
predictions criminologists have been able to make simply are not
accurate; assessments of dangerousness do not work. When Kennedy
stresses that "it's not our list," he seems to criticize the methods used to
generate it-perhaps because it was based entirely on criminal history
files, without access to the situated knowledge of professionals and onthe-ground community members in the working group.105 It is tempting
to conclude that CIRV members had no principled reason to reject the
likely killers list, just reasons to want to fine-tune it. Perhaps it is
nothing but the "huge outcry" 106 that led CIRV to reject this particular
attempt to use malleable laws to assess and incapacitate the
dangerous; perhaps the concern for fairness arose from pragmatism
rather than principle. Perhaps it simply reflects the humane
sensibilities of the people who happened to be involved in this
particular project, rather than anything essential in the focused
deterrence model.
Perhaps. But I want to consider the possibility that the logic of
focused deterrence requires a commitment to individual rights that is
inconsistent with the purely utilitarian tendencies Dubber identifies, as
well as the broader corrosion of limits on state authority that makes
those tendencies possible. At their best, focused deterrence projects are
not just efforts to incapacitate especially dangerous individuals (though
they can and have degenerated into that on many occasions). To the
KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 243.
10'
See, e.g., Jessica Brown & Jane Prendergast, Group Offers 'Likely Killers' List, CIN.
ENQUIRER, Apr. 23, 2007, at Al.
102

'

KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 243.

Elsewhere he and others do seem to tout their ability to predict just who will become
involved in violence. If anything, however, clinical judgment based on this kind of ineffable
situated knowledge has proven less successful than actuarial instruments in prediction. See, e.g.,
William Grove et al., Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: A Meta-Analysis, 12 PSYCHOL.
ASSESSMENT 19 (2000).
ion

10

KENNEDY, supra note 45, at
243.
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extent that they truly aim to generate deterrence, they can and should
be viewed as efforts to establish a particular kind of societal selfdefense that is entirely consistent with respect for individual rightsand indeed that demands it.107

Three decades ago, Warren Quinn maintained that "a practice of
punishment is at its moral core a practice of self-protective threats,"
and he argued that these threats are perfectly consistent with a
deontological, rights-respecting morality.1 08 Quinn imagined a
inflicts
automatically
that
device
sophisticated
fantastically
punishment on anyone who commits a crime with at least as much
accuracy as our current system of criminal justice. It would be a
legitimate act of self-defense to activate that device as a deterrent-we
can use force to defend our rights, so surely we can activate a device
that threatens to use force to do so. (With an important caveat: since
the kind of self-defense one can employ against an attack on one's
rights is limited, the kind of punishment the device can legitimately
inflict is limited in the same way; this is the source of the
proportionality constraint on deterrent punishments.) Quinn argued
that the right to make and carry out deterrent threats is on the same
moral footing as the right to activate such an imaginary device. Neither
one ignores the rights of the people it threatens; both are tailored to the
complex structure of those rights. 109
107
Although the specific argument about the justification and moral limits of deterrence that I
will develop may be controversial, any reasonable account of deterrence must recognize some
moral limits-or so its leading modern theorists concede. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON
HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL 32-50 (1973); Johannes
Andenaes, The Morality of Deterrence, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 649, 650 (1970). In that respect, while
some of the specific substantive claims I make about the ethical values that should guide focused
deterrence projects may be arguable, some moral guideposts are unavoidable.
108 Warren Quinn, The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 327,
336 (1985). He continues: "We cannot object to certain deterrent threats of punishment that stand
against us because others have a right to try to protect themselves from us by these means."
Quinn's work (collected in MORALITY AND ACTION (Philippa Foot ed., 1993)), has had a major
influence on the resurgence of deontological moral theory. See Thomas Nagel, The Value of
Inviolability, in MORALITY AND SELF-INTEREST 102 (Paul Bloomfield ed., 2008); F. M. Kamm, NonConsequentialism, the Person as an End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status, 21 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 354 (1992) (reviewing SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY (1982) and Warren Quinn,
Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing, 98 PHIL. REV. 287
(1989)).
109 Quinn, supra note 108, at 337-47. Quinn also writes:

Innocent actions that do not menace others are morally protected. This protection
consists in the fact that we may not in general attempt to prevent them coercively or
frustrate them violently. Violations of important moral rights are, on the other hand,
morally exposed. That is, we may try to prevent or frustrate them by means that would,
in other contexts, violate their agents' rights.
Id. at 346. He continues: 'Morality ... designs variances in some of our rights so that these rights
will not interfere with a range of defensive strategies." Id. at 349. In effect, Quinn insists that
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Focused deterrence projects should be viewed as this kind of selfprotective threat. At their core, they deliver a specific threat about the
sanctions that will follow unless the targeted offenders cease offending,
and they aim to create an organizational structure that will quickly and
automatically make good on that threat if they do not. Quinn's
argument is that this is precisely the form that morally defensible
crime prevention should take. Unlike selective incapacitation and other
utilitarian strategies, focused deterrence does not require (as Quinn
puts it) "any neglect of rights for the sake of effects."1 10 This
interpretation makes sense of CIRV's rejection of the "likely killers
list," as well as the limited and controversial role of many other purely
predictive practices in the history of the focused deterrence model. It
also makes sense of the common and growing concern for the rights and
dignity of would-be offenders that many focused deterrence projects
have exhibited, despite their unapologetic embrace of the need for swift
and certain deterrent punishment.
In these respects, the focused deterrence model can and should
reflect a commitment to substantive moral values other than crime
control. Those values provide principled guidance for the legitimate use
of discretionary authority.
A.

Deterrence and Fair Notice

Consider, for example, how the logic of deterrence has led many of
these projects to make enforcement practices more transparent to the
suspected offenders they target. Lack of transparency in this respect is
a major problem associated with overcriminalization. Because it is
typically impossible to enforce overbroad laws to the letter, officials
must devote their limited attention to a subset of potential cases, and
potential lawbreakers rarely know what they must do to stay out of
properly crafted deterrence need not treat its objects as "rightless." Contra POLICE POWER, supra

note 95, at 126 ('The 'criminal classes' were the proper objects of policing because they, through
their criminal act, had become rightless.")
The right to threaten punishment follows fairly easily from the right to activate the device

that Quinn imagines, but the right to actually carry out the threat once it has been made is harder
to justify. I will not try to summarize Quinn's difficult argument here, but the basic idea-"[i]f the
urgency

of self-protection

makes

moral

room

for threats

it also

makes

moral room

for

punishment"-seems plausible. Quinn, supra note 108, at 370. Phillip Montague provides a
simpler analysis of the same problem:
[I]f establishing a system of punishment is justified, then creating certain positions that
system requires, with their attendant responsibilities, is justified, and the people who
occupy those positions are certainly justified in fulfilling their responsibilities-that is,
presumptively justified in participating in the punishment of individuals.
PHILLIP MONTAGUE, PUNISHMENT AS SOCIETAL SELF-DEFENSE 72 (1995).
"o

Quinn, supra note 108, at 373.
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trouble. In this respect, overbreadth is a species of vagueness, and like
all forms of vagueness it undercuts the aspect of rule of law ideals that
is sometimes called "fair notice." As Stuntz has observed, however, this
concern about the unfairness of vague laws is simultaneously a concern
about deterrence:
Broad criminal codes ensure inconsistency. Broad codes cannot
be enforced as written; thus, the definition of the law-on-thestreet necessarily differs, and may differ a lot, from the law-onthe-books..

.

. [A] signal that cannot be seen is a very poor

signal. Law-on-the-street, the sum of millions of arrest and
prosecution decisions by thousands of police officers and
prosecutors, seems designed to minimize visibility."
In his final book, Stuntz returned to the muddied message that
overbroad laws convey, and he illustrated the problem with an example
from Boston. In 2007, when local officials came to believe that a gang
called the Lucerne Street Doggz had carried out dozens of shootings
and six murders in just two years, federal prosecutors aimed to
incapacitate the group by making maximum use of laws against buying
and selling drugs and guns. 112 Stuntz complained that the message
conveyed by such prosecutions is indecipherable.
Recall the Lucerne Street bust. The gun and drug charges filed
in that case may track gang members' history of criminal
violence, but only in the aggregate. The gang was targeted
because of the many acts of violence its members committed,
and (at least in part) because of the many acts of violence
members of other Boston gangs committed. But no gang member
knows which particular acts of violence prompt such targeting.
From the point of view of any individual offender, the odds that
any particular shooting will lead to a later drug trafficking
11 3
prosecution must be very low.

As criticisms of the drug laws themselves and the way they are
ordinarily used, this critique rings true, but this particular example is
poorly chosen. Although Stuntz does not discuss the connection, the
Lucerne Street Doggz case was an explicit offshoot of the Boston Gun
Project, which had fallen apart in 2000 but had been revived six years
later under newly-appointed Police Commissioner Edward Davis.
" PathologicalPolitics, supra note 2, at 521-22.
112

STUNTZ, supra note 1, at 269-70.

n1

Id. at 273.
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Properly conducted, the focused deterrence strategy explicitly
addresses the concern that pretextual enforcement sends a muddied
signal. A central point of the "call-ins" and related communications
strategies is to clarify the rationale for pretextual enforcement. Stuntz
worried that "no gang member knows which particular acts of violence
prompt such targeting," 114 but the Boston Gun Project explained that
connection explicitly and repeatedly.
For Kennedy, like Stuntz himself, that strategy flows from a
concern for effective deterrence-from a recognition that sanctions only
deter if people know of them and believe them 1 1 5-but it also relates to
the concern about fairness. Explicit statements about how discretion
will be used provide the fair notice component of due process ideals.
Kennedy recognizes as much in several places: "because of the explicit
communication with gang members, the approach seemed to be
fundamentally fair. 'Here's how the game's going to be played,' gang
members were told."116 The same idea underlies U.S. Attorney Don
Stern's promise, quoted earlier, that targets of concentrated
enforcement would "get fair warning."1 17 Community members
reinforced this idea. Tracy Lithcutt, head of the streetworkers, told
gang members: "If you don't hear what's being said to you today . .. it's
on your heads." 18 The idea has deep roots in the focused deterrence
model. The "Operation Scrap Iron" initiative that the original Boston
Gun Project grew out of began with a campaign to put targeted gang
members on notice, as youth workers, probation officers, and police:
took pains to convey why they were there and what would happen if-,
violence continued. 119 From the beginning, a central thrust of most of
these projects has been to articulate how discretion will be used
explicitly and publicly-not just within focused deterrence working
group but to the wider world as well. These efforts to communicate how
discretion will be used aim to maximize deterrence, but in the process
they advance the rule of law as well. Not every deterrence strategy
accomplishes both goals simultaneously, 12 0 but these examples
illustrate how it is possible to do so.

"

William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 2025 (2008).

116

See, e.g., KENNEDY ET AL., supra note 51, at 39; KENNEDY, supra note 71, at 123-27.
KENNEDY ET AL., supra note 51, at
29.

1"

Id. at 40.

"

KENNEDY ET AL., supra note 45, at 65.

115

"
"Throughout the operation, [Youth Violence Strike Force] officers, probation officers, and
Streetworkers had told gang members directly why the crackdown was occurring and what it

would take to make it stop." KENNEDY, supra note 51, at 27-28.
'20

For example, Giuliani's randomized "federal day" crackdowns may or may not have been an

effective deterrence strategy, but they clearly did not provide fair notice to the people they
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Morality's Constraints

While respect for individual rights and effective crime prevention
sometimes coincide, at other times they may point in different
directions. In those cases, the morality of deterrence rules out some of
the crime prevention strategies that some focused deterrence initiatives
have been tempted to employ. In particular, to show proper respect for
individual rights, deterrent threats and the punishments that carry
them out must be motivated by and proportioned to their target's own
potentially wrongful behavior. 12 1 We do not treat a person as a mere
means to an end when we place him under a threat to compel him to
respect our rights, but we do use him-and thereby violate his rightsif we punish him in order to deter others. 122 The justification for
deterrent threats (and for the punishments that carry out those
threats, if it comes to that) can never be vicarious.
That constraint raises significant questions for the focused
deterrence model, which has used various forms of collective
responsibility as a core crime prevention tactic. Some of those tactics
may be legitimate, but they require more careful moral scrutiny than
they have often received. One of the most innovative post-Boston
focused deterrence projects was launched in Lowell, Massachusetts, in
the fall of 2002. Cambodian and Laotian gangs were a major source of
youth violence in the city, but they proved resistant to the techniques
that had been developed elsewhere. Unable to exert much direct
influence over the young gang members themselves, the project
searched for other sources of leverage over their behavior. Eventually
officials hit on the strategy of strictly enforcing anti-gaming laws
against older relatives, who often ran illegal gambling businesses. Until
the youth violence stopped, gambling would receive intensive
affected; see Husak, supra note 59. Some focused deterrence projects have also failed in this
respect. Boston made a deliberate decision not to warn the Vamp Hill Kings (the first gang
targeted in the original Gun Project) before taking action-before serving old warrants, stepping
up probation enforcement, fast tracking state prosecution, referring cases for federal prosecutions,
and initiating deportation proceedings. Officials believed that this initial crackdown needed to
take place before issuing a warning "to build credibility;" the Vamps were invited to their first callin several weeks later. Id. at 34. Los Angeles apparently never communicated its enforcement
plans with the two gangs the project targeted. Some cities have decided explicitly not to notify the
people who wind up on their high-priority "chronic violent offender" lists. These decisions may or
may not have been effective ways of maximizing deterrence, but they clearly failed to provide fair
notice. When the decision to concentrate discretionary enforcement on particular people and
groups can carry such momentous consequences,

and when such concentrated enforcement

represents a major departure from the status quo, these decisions invite the concerns about fair
notice that the best focused deterrence initiatives help to resolve.
121
E.g., the "morally exposed" actions that Quinn describes in an earlier quotation, not the
"morally protected" innocent actions he describes in the same passage.
122
See Quinn, supra note 108, at 345-46.
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enforcement. As one overview of the project summarized it: "Lowell
officials applied an additional lever to adult offenders involved in illegal
gaming activities with the goal of having the adults exert influence over
youths involved in street violence." 123
Described in that way, the Lowell project seems ethically troubling.
The severe threat of intensive enforcement directed at adult gambling
was not justified by the serious character of gambling itself but by the
seriousness of youth violence. The "pulling levers" strategy implies that
officials will mine their discretionary authority to impose the harshest
possible sanctions, but gambling itself hardly seems to warrant such a
draconian response. In that respect the project seems to use the adult
gamblers as a mere means to an end. 12 4
More detailed descriptions of the project provide a different
perspective. As the national Project Safe Neighborhoods evaluation
describes it, the Working Group's understanding of Lowell's East Asian
gang problem evolved as officials developed better intelligence sources
about these uncommonly secretive organizations. It became clear over
time that the neighborhoods' youth gangs were closely connected with
the gambling operations. Gang members appeared suspiciously often in
neighborhood gambling dens and casinos, and some of them seemed to
work as runners for the illegal businesses. Eventually it became clear
that at least some of the gangs were actually part of the gambling
businesses, which regularly called on them to collect gambling debts
and otherwise protect their business interests. The "gambling elders"
were not simply legally vulnerable community members who happened
to have leverage over young gang members. They supported and even
encouraged the gang members' activities directly, and in that respect
they shared at least some moral responsibility for the violence itself.
That responsibility makes the crackdown on their activity easier to
justify. Moreover, the crackdown itself was more measured than the
"pulling levers" metaphor seems to imply. In practice, it might amount
only to parking a police car outside an illegal casino, coupled with a
warning that "when violence erupts, no one makes money."125
"' Edmund McGarrell, Focused Deterrence and 'Pulling Levers", in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1667 (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd eds., 2014).

Kennedy gives a similar account: "In Lowell, Massachusetts, authorities working with Harvard
researcher Anthony Braga addressed street shootings by young Asian gang members by raiding
the gambling enterprises of their elders-and telling the elders that the shootings were bringing
the unwanted attention. The shootings stopped entirely." KENNEDY, supra note 72, at 117.
124
Moreover, it seems to do so in racially inequitable ways: low-level gambling offenses in the
city's Southeast Asian communities will receive attention when similar offenses elsewhere do not.
"' Anthony Braga et al., Understandingand Preventing Gang Violence: Problem Analysis and
Response Development in Lowell, Massachusetts, 9 POLICE Q. 20, 40 (2006); accord JACK MCDEvITT
ET AL., LOWELL, DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS: CASE STUDY 6, A PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS
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Without this background, Lowell's strategy seems problematic. It
would be illegitimate to prosecute a no-holds-barred crackdown on
petty gambling by a gang member's family to try to force the family to
pressure the gang member to change his ways: that would be a clear
case of the kind of vicarious punishment that any plausible morality
condemns. It is worrisome that the focused deterrence literature has
often recounted this oversimplified version of Lowell's experience as if
it were an accurate description of events in that city-and, under that
description, as something worth emulating. That version of the Lowell
story can usefully serve as a hypothetical case in which stern
deterrence might be effective but would nevertheless be unjustified.
The actual chain of events in Lowell, by contrast, represents a
sophisticated effort to grapple with the complex issue of group
responsibility. That issue has a central place in many focused
deterrence initiatives, which often target the group structure of
criminal offending. 126 Lowell's experience provides an especially exotic
example of the form that structure can take; the internal dynamics of
gangs themselves (and group-based offending more generally) provide a
more straightforward and pervasive example. As Kennedy puts it in a
discussion of Operation Ceasefire's prototype:
It was deterrence aimed at the group, the gang. Criminal justice
is almost entirely about individuals. A drug crew can get some
besotted juvenile to kill someone; when he does, he, not the drug
crew, gets arrested. Short of exotic RICO and conspiracy
prosecutions, which are in practice exceedingly rare, groups get
no formal legal attention at all. But gangs were driving
things. 127
The point here is not just a Machiavellian tactical claim that
interventions against people who happen to have leverage over
criminals of interest may be effective. Kennedy seems to take pains to
register a moral concern about the way so many of the people who drive
community violence escape responsibility, as in the case of the drug
crew members who "get some besotted juvenile to kill someone" with
impunity. 128 Formal legal strategies for enforcing group responsibility,
STRATEGIC INTERVENTION 12-14 (2007).
126
See, e.g., Andrew Papachristos & David S. Kirk, Changing the Street Dynamic: Evaluating
Chicago's Group Violence Reduction Strategy, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 525 (2015).
Kennedy's most detailed analysis of the focused deterrence model emphasizes that the capacity to
impose group responsibility is a distinctive advantage of strategies that rely heavily on discretion.
KENNEDY, supra note 71, at 121-22.
127
KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 53.
128

Id.
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such as RICO statutes, have so far proven unsuitable (particularly
when the group's responsibility for violence is less direct than
Kennedy's example of the "besotted" youth implies). Perhaps the
discretion granted to law enforcement officials can be legitimately used
to fill this void, as long as those who wield it make an earnest attempt
to sort out meaningful distinctions in moral responsibility. Those
distinctions are often very difficult, but the complexity of the hardest
cases need not paralyze judgment in simpler ones. There is a clear
distinction, for example, between targeting an uncle simply because he
can exert influence on his nephew and targeting a fellow gang member
who did not pull the trigger but might, and who approves of it. That
form of group-based responsibility-for example, warning an entire
group that "gun use by any one member of the gang would result in
legal problems for all members," 129 and telling them if "[y]ou see one of
your boys picking up a gun," they have a responsibility to "tell him to
put it down" 130-may sometimes be justified. 131 It is, in any case, a far
less sweeping and more refined strategy than the blunderbuss
assessments of dangerousness that discretionary justice ordinarily
contributes to.
VI. CONCLUSION
The breadth of the criminal law and the massive discretion it
creates are among the most significant challenges facing American
criminal justice today. They enable arbitrary and excessive
punishments, they undermine the system's transparency and
accountability, and they chip away at the protections that individual
rights ought to provide. They threaten to fundamentally undermine the
rule of law.
And yet it is hard to see how we can put the genie back in the
bottle. Many contemporary critics of overcriminalization aim to develop
principles of restraint that can be used to identify legislative overreach,
but all of them recognize the significant obstacles to any effort to define
and enforce principled limits to the scope of the criminal law. 132

"

Philip Cook et al., Gun Control, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 281 (James

Q.

Wilson & Joan

Petersilia eds., 2011).
130

KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 67.

The topic is too complex to treat in any detail here. Useful touchstones for thinking about
collective responsibility include Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. PHIL. 674 (1968);
John Kekes, Collective Responsibility as a Problem for Liberalism, 20 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 416
(1995); Dennis Thompson, Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands,
74 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 905 (1980).
131

132

See, e.g., HUSAK, supra note 59, at 62-63; Luna, supra note 2, at 729-31; STUNTZ, supra

note 1, at 301-02.
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Historical examples of successful legal efforts to narrow the scope of the
criminal law are few and far between, and the examples that exist do
not seem to offer much hope.
The focused deterrence projects I have described in this paper,
along with the broader idea of problem-oriented policing they apply,
represent a different response to the problem of overcriminalization-a
response based on administrative strategies for improving the way
discretion is exercised rather than a legislative effort to eliminate it.
Ultimately they aim to influence the ethical commitments of
enforcement officials rather than the content of the law itself. That
characteristic makes it possible to narrow the law's application in a
more tailored, contextually informed way than is possible through
legislative reform.13 3
Even at its best, the focused deterrence model obviously does not
"solve" the problem of overcriminalization. Discretion still exists, and
prosecutors, police, and other enforcement officials can still abuse it. As
I have repeatedly illustrated, they have sometimes done so in the name
of the focused deterrence model itself. The hope is simply that the
proliferation of focused deterrence projects will redirect more decisions
about how enforcement discretion should be used down the structured,
deliberative channels those projects establish. Every case brought
through the local Operation Ceasefire is potentially a case that will not
be brought in a more cavalier way. U.S. Attorneys' capacity to bring
federal gun charges is limited, and in jurisdictions where much of that
capacity is devoted to cases nominated through the deliberations of a
focused deterrence working group, less remains to be harnessed in
more haphazard ways. The High Point police department's narcotics
unit is finite, and capacity directed to the West End through the drug
market initiative cannot be squandered elsewhere.
The existence of the focused deterrence alternative can also ground
the critique of less principled uses of discretion. The targeted use of
discretionary authority to pursue identifiable serious offendersdetermined to be so based on deliberation and investigation-puts the
more cavalier use of that authority that prevails in so many cities in
stark relief. We can more clearly articulate what is wrong with
blunderbuss stop-and-frisk initiatives and intensive drug market
crackdowns by pointing to the focused deterrence model as a viable
alternative. (That was exactly what happened in Cincinnati, where
Streicher and many of his staff gradually came to reject many of the

"Law enforcement, criminal justice, is a massive, one-size-fits all architecture," Kennedy
observes. "It's the same for everybody, everywhere, all the time. This was focused, customized,
particular, highly specific." KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 54.
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department's old ways of using discretion as the focused deterrence
model took hold). 134
In some of these respects, the focused deterrence model represents
a return to the "rulemaking" model that emerged from the ABFinspired critique of overcriminalization in the 1960s. Both models rely
on administrative practices to channel criminal justice discretion out of
a belief that legal tools can never do the job alone. 135 The earlier debate
about police rulemaking, however, clarified many of the limitations of
the strategy. Ronald Allen, one of rulemaking's most forceful critics,
argued its limitations at length, and we do not need to agree with all of
his arguments to share his conclusion that police rulemaking is
unlikely to resolve all of the concerns about the rule of law that
inspired it.136 Focused deterrence projects address those concerns in a
way that avoids many of rulemaking's limitations. Their relevance to
those concerns and their potential to overcome those limitations should
not be surprising, since the focused deterrence model descends from the
problem-oriented policing strategy into which rulemaking evolved.
Most important, the case-by-case deliberation that the focused
deterrence model emphasizes has the potential to avoid the rigidity of
rulemaking. Despite the best intentions, the guidelines that some police
agencies developed in the 1970s often seemed to become just another
form of law, and the effort to use rulemaking to channel discretion
faced the same obstacles as legal reform itself. 137 Situated deliberation

" See note 66 and the associated text above. Cf. James Forman, Jr. & Trevor Stuntz, Beyond
Stop and Frisk, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/20/opinion/betterways-to-police-than-stop-and-frisk.html? r=0. The same comparison has taken a more abstract
and general turn in Sabel & Simon, supra note 14, which unfavorably contrasts what they call
"assertive policing" with the focused deterrence model as an elaboration of problem-oriented
policing.
1
Both also run up against the challenge of acknowledging and justifying selective
enforcement. In his earliest reflections on guidelines, Goldstein observed that "[t]he whole thought
of trying to defend a policy of selective enforcement is a bit frightening." Herman Goldstein, Police
Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real, 23 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 140, 145 (1963). More than four
decades later, the troubled Baltimore focused deterrence project ran into debilitating controversy
over concerns about selective prosecution. As one Mayoral spokesman put it: "[H]aving enough

&

information to indict somebody and then not actually doing so is not something that this group felt
was appropriate." Justin Fenton, A Look At What Works In Fighting City Crime: Baltimore Joins
Network To Discuss Safety Strategies, BALT. SUN (June 24, 2009), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/
2009-06-24/news/0906230065_ 1_baltimore-officials-drug-market-network [perma.cc/6DNG-666N].
136 See Allen, supra note 19. Here I depart from the specific tool emphasized
by Friedman
Ponomarenko, supra note 29, at 1832, 1884. Rulemaking has an important role to play,
particularly in the tactical areas that Friedman and Ponomarenko focus on, but by itself it cannot
adequately channel the discretion embodied in the substantive criminal law.
137 As Goldstein put it two decades after the guidelines movement's peak: "The intent, on
the
part of the original proponents [of written guidelines for the use of discretion], was to view the
development of policy as a way to encourage responsible thought about a difficult issue and to view
the end product as a conclusion of this process-as a statement of the way in which a given police
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about how discretion should be used is different. There may be no exact
rule for distinguishing "slight," "petty," and "trifling" violations of the
law from those that deserve serious attention, but discretionary
judgment can make those distinctions easily. 138 The focused deterrence
model encourages the people who make those discretionary judgments
to do so more consistently by making them more explicit, transparent,
and informed. The grounded analyses it calls for make it possible to use
legal discretion in a defensible, tailored way, enacting complex values
that general legal or administrative codes can never adequately
capture.
More subtly, but relatedly, the focused deterrence model may avoid
another important barrier to rulemaking: the fact that criminal justice
officials are reluctant to embrace a self-imposed effort to restrict their
authority more narrowly than the legislature requires. 139 Focused
deterrence initiatives influence police decision-making in a way that
may not feel quite so limiting. They are not ex ante restraints on police
authority that potentially disarm officers before it is clear what is
really at stake. They take shape as an effort to develop principled
responses to specific community problems through careful deliberation
about the best course of action with a range of affected interestspolice, prosecutors, parole and probation agents, community members,
service providers, and sometimes even (though arguably not as often as
they should) the defense bar. Abstract debates about "tying the hands
of the police" give way to specific questions about how particular people
can legitimately be treated, and the answers must be justified
deliberatively to a working group rather than made unilaterally by an
isolated officer.

agency thinks about a problem-which can then serve as guidance for its personnel. The tendency
in practice, however, is to treat anything that is written down as rules, which then are interpreted
as edicts. When this occurs, the desired flexibility is lost, and any necessary diversion from the
rules to meet the variety of situations the police confront returns the police to acting in a sub rosa
manner." Goldstein, supra note 23, at 55.
"8

NICHOLAS PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE 288 (2013). Parrillo describes the rise of

discretionary administration in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a solution to the
problem of rigid rules across a wide range of regulatory domains: "No rule could describe with
perfect accuracy the conduct that lawmakers intended to proscribe, so lawmakers commonly wrote
an overly broad rule whose sharp edges could be 'sanded off' through selective nonenforcement."
Id. at 40. For example, as Congress became concerned that law enforcement by U.S. Attorneys had
become "excessively, perversely rule-bound" by the end of the nineteenth century, it took steps "to
stop officers from standing on the letter of the law and instead focus on its amorphous 'spirit',"
allowing "the scope of statutory criminal liability to remain broad while trusting in street-level
discretion to remedy its overbreadth, case by case." Id. at 288.
139
As Goldstein acknowledged, the typical police official is often more than tolerant towards
overbroad laws: "His attitude is often that the law should be left on the books; it may come in
handy sometime." Goldstein, supra note 135, at 144; accord Allen, supra note 19, at 106-07.
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In these ways, focused deterrence has the potential to uphold the
demands of legality in a world where full enforcement has become
chimerical. For a critic like Dubber, the massive overbreadth of modern
criminal law has undermined legality altogether; law is replaced with
police-the unconstrained will of the sovereign state. Those
alternatives do not exhaust the field. There is legality short of
mechanical enforcement;14 0 indeed mechanical enforcement itself is
another kind of tyranny. 141 True justice lies not in reviving a simplified
ideal of the rule of law but in developing an ethic of discretionary
justice. That is precisely what the best focused deterrence projects
strive to do.
Focused deterrence has been celebrated as a dramatically effective
strategy for combating violence and other crimes that tear communities
apart. I have tried to argue that it also has the potential to become a
dramatically effective strategy for restoring the rule of law. Just as.
communities plagued by violence can turn to the focused deterrence:
model for guidance, communities plagued by an arbitrary and excessive
system of criminal justice can do the same. 142 Some of the guidance it

See the references in note 14 above.
PARRILLO, supra note 138, at 40 ("[W]ithout these kinds of forbearance, alien governance
could become so radically divorced from prevailing moral sentiment or so practically unbearable
that it would lose even the grudging cooperation of the populace"). The most prominent dissent
from this perspective comes from Hayek, who insisted on rigorous enforcement of the law as
140

written: "It may even be said that for the Rule of Law to be effective it is more important that
there should be a rule applied always without exceptions than what this rule is. Often the content
of the rule is indeed of minor importance, provided the same rule is universally enforced." HAYEK,

supra note 13, at 117. This commitment reflected Hayek's emphasis on the economic realm, and
his fervent hope for a predictable field of action in that domain: "Like the laws of nature, the laws
of the state provide fixed features in the environment in which [a person] has to move; though they
eliminate certain choices open to him, they do not, as a rule, limit the choices to some specific
action that somebody else wants him to take." F. A. HAYEK, The Constitution of Liberty, in THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF F.A. HAYEK, VOL. 17: THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 221 (2007). Whatever

the merits of this view in the economic realm, it makes less sense for criminal justice. Perhaps
there is no moral reason to hold a farmer responsible for the damage his cows have done to a

neighbor's unfenced plot, rather than hold the neighbor responsible for failing to erect a fence; in
that case it may matter more that the rule that fixes liability be clear than what that rule is. See
Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 2 (1960). But the same cannot be
said in the domain of criminal law. It matters morally whether criminal law defines robbery as

taking something by force or threat of force or, alternatively, theft while in possession of a weapon.
As it happens, consistent enforcement of either rule will sometimes be obtuse. Intelligent
application of both rules together may be necessary to truly identify those who are morally

blameworthy to the same degree-and it is identifying that group of equally blameworthy people
that must be the goal for criminal law enforcement.
142 The organization of Kennedy's most recent account of focused deterrence seems to imply
this understanding. The book begins with an account of the riots that erupted in Cincinnati after

police shot Timothy Thomas in 2001, KENNEDY, supra note 45, at 1, and it concludes with an
account of Cincinnati's transformation under a U.S. Department of Justice consent decree that
mandated problem-oriented policing. Id. at 232-66. I have only tried to provide philosophical and
historical context for this new and promising account of what focused deterrence involves.
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provides is reasonably clear: establish a working group with a mandate
to identify significant community problems, understand who and what
is responsible for those problems, and decide systematically how to use
the broad authority that is available to intervene. The deliberation that
takes place in these forums brings the exercise of criminal justice
discretion out of the shadows, subjecting it to explicit and collaborative
scrutiny. That process has great potential to make the exercise of
authority more consistent with rule of law values.
Beyond that basic advice, however, many accounts of focused
deterrence provide too little guidance about how working group
deliberations can best realize that potential. In some cases, the advice
they provide may even be counterproductive. The task is undoubtedly
difficult, and the necessary guidance may always remain complex and
indeterminate, but in this paper I have tried to begin to articulate the
considerations that need attention and to identify the kinds of practices
that merit further scrutiny. Working group deliberations cannot focus
exclusively on the instrumental question of which strategies will most
effectively reduce crime; they also need to consider whether those
strategies use discretionary authority consistently, transparently, and
in a manner that respects the rights and responsibilities of the people
involved. Focused deterrence initiatives may need to reject practices
that some participants consider to be effective tools for crime
prevention because those practices undermine the rule of law.
Judgments and distinctions like these have received too little attention
in a literature dominated by concerns about crime control. Those
concerns are understandable, but the neglect of rule of law values
makes focused deterrence vulnerable to critics who view it as
unethical. 143 Future work should aim to provide as much guidance
about how the focused deterrence model can advance the rule of law as
it does about how it can maximize crime prevention.
The most promising aspect of the focused deterrence model lies in
its ability to provide both kinds of guidance simultaneously. At its best,
focused deterrence embodies a morally sensitive crime prevention

143
See supra note 9. The focused deterrence project in Chattanooga, Tennessee recently
stalled in the face of serious conflicts with the county District Attorney after he raised ethical
concerns about devoting special attention to cases the working group had nominated. Shelly
Bradbury & Zack Peterson, District Attorney Neal Pinkston Says He Won't Give VRI Cases

Priority, CHATTANOOGA

TIMES

FREE PRESS (Nov.

8,

2015),

http: //www.timesfreepress.com/

news/local/story/20 15/nov/08/district-attorney-neal-pinkstsays-he-wont-giv/334595/ [https://perma.
cc/SE2S-AKGG]. Whether or not those concerns are legitimate or sincere is impossible to judge
from a distance. What seems clear, however, is that focused deterrence projects that take the high
moral ground by embracing rule of law values will be in an especially strong position to address
concerns of that kind.
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strategy rooted in the right to self-defense, worked out over decades of
reflection on the problem of criminal justice discretion.

